Sheetz v. El Dorado County

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.¶verify

George Sheetz sued El Dorado County, alleging that the county’s actions violated the Takings Clause under the test this Court set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n , 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U. S. 374 (1994). State courts dismissed Mr. Sheetz’s suit, holding that the Nollan/Dolan test applies only in challenges to administrative, not legislative, actions. Today, the county essentially confesses error, and the Court corrects the state courts’ mistake. It does so because our Constitution deals in substance, not form. However the government chooses to act, whether by way of regulation ''or statute, or ordinance, or miscellaneous decree,'' it must follow the same constitutional rules. Ante, at 9 (quoting Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid , 594 U. S. 139, 149 (2021)).¶verify

The Court notes but does not address a separate question: whether the Nollan/Dolan test operates differently when an alleged taking affects a “class of properties” rather than “a particular development.” Ante, at 11. But how could it? To assess whether a government has engaged in a taking by imposing a condition on the development of land, the Nollan/Dolan test asks whether the condition in question bears an ''essential nexus'' to the government’s land-use interest and has ''rough proportionality'' to a property’s impact on that interest. Ante, at 6. Nothing about that test depends on whether the government imposes the challenged condition on a large class of properties or a single tract or something in between. Once more, how the government acts may vary but the Constitution’s standard for assessing those actions does not.¶verify

Our precedents confirm as much. In Nollan , the California Coastal Commission told the plaintiffs that they could build a home on their land only if they accepted an easement allowing public access across their property along the beach. The plaintiffs argued that the commission’s demand amounted to a taking without just compensation, and the Court agreed. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that the commission hadn’t singled out the plaintiffs’ particular property for special treatment but “had similarly conditioned” dozens of other building projects. 483 U. S., at 829. It acknowledged, too, that the commission’s demand of the plaintiffs came about only because of a ''comprehensive program'' demanding similar public access easements up and down the California coast. Id., at 841. But none of that made any difference in the Court’s analysis, the test it applied, or the conclusion it reached. All that mattered was whether the government’s action amounted to an uncompensated taking of the property of the plaintiffs whose case was actually before the Court. Id., at 838.¶verify

In Dolan , the Court faced a similar situation and reached a similar conclusion. There, an Oregon municipality conditioned a building permit on the plaintiff ’s agreement to dedicate part of her land to “flood control and traffic improvements.” 512 U. S., at 377. No one suggested that the city had targeted the plaintiff ’s development for special treatment; everyone agreed that the city’s challenged action was the result of a “comprehensive land use pla[n],” one developed to meet “statewide planning goals.” Ibid. Even so, the Court held an “individualized determination” necessary to determine whether an unconstitutional taking had occurred under the same test the Court applied in Nollan .¶verify

512 U. S., at 393.¶verify

The logic of today’s decision is entirely consistent with these conclusions. The Takings Clause, the Court stresses, is no ''poor relation’ to other constitutional rights.” Ante, at 10 (quoting Dolan , 512 U. S., at 392). And the government rarely mitigates a constitutional problem by multiplying it. A governmentally imposed condition on the freedom of speech, the right to assemble, or the right to confront one’s accuser, for example, is no more permissible when enforced against a large “class” of persons than it is when enforced against a “particular” group. If takings claims must receive “like treatment,” ante, at 10, whether the government owes just compensation for taking your property cannot depend on whether it has taken your neighbors’ property too.¶verify

In short, nothing in Nollan , Dolan , or today’s decision supports distinguishing between government actions against the many and the few any more than it supports distinguishing between legislative and administrative actions. In all these settings, the same constitutional rules apply. With that understanding, I am pleased to join the Court’s opinion.¶verify