Feliciano v. Department Of Transportation

Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.¶verify

Tens of thousands of federal civilian employees serve the Nation as military reservists. When the military calls those reservists to active duty, it often pays them less than they earn in their civilian jobs. Seeking to address that gap, Congress some years ago adopted a “differential pay” statute. That law requires the government to make up the difference between a federal civilian employee's military and civilian pay in various circumstances, including when he is called to active duty “during a national emergency.” The question we face concerns the meaning of that quoted language. Does it guarantee a reservist differential pay when he serves on active duty while a national emergency is ongoing, or does it require a reservist to prove that his service bears a “substantive connection” to a particular national emergency?¶verify

I¶verify

Nick Feliciano began working for the Federal Aviation Administration as an air traffic controller in 2005. App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. At the same time, Mr. Feliciano served as a reserve petty officer in the United States Coast Guard. Ibid. ; Brief for Respondent 6. In July 2012, the Coast¶verify

Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Ashley Moody of Florida, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Russell Coleman of Kentucky, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Dave Yost of Ohio, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Michelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Jason S. Miyares of Virginia, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Josh Kaul of Wisconsin; for the American Federation of Government Employees by Matthew W. Milledge , David A. Borer , and Andres M. Grajales ; for Members of Congress by Timothy Taylor and Sarah Kelly-Kilgore ; for Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc., by Melanie L. Bostwick and John B. Wells ; for the National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium by Katie M. Becker and Brent G. Filbert ; and for the Reserve Organization of America by Scott A. Felder .¶verify

Guard ordered him to active-duty service and, for the most part, he remained on active duty until February 2017. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a.¶verify

During much of that period, the statutory authority for Mr. Feliciano's active-duty service came from 10 U. S. C. § 12301(d). As a general matter, that provision authorizes the activation of reservists with their consent. Mr. Feliciano's § 12301(d) orders noted that he was called to active duty to serve “in support of” several “contingency operation[s],” including Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a, 75a–76a; Brief for Respondent 7. Throughout his active-duty service, Mr. Feliciano served onboard a Coast Guard ship escorting other vessels to and from harbor. Brief for Petitioner 8; Brief for Respondent 6.¶verify

While Mr. Feliciano served on active duty pursuant to orders under § 12301(d), the government did not afford him differential pay. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a, 34a–37a. Eventually, that led Mr. Feliciano to seek relief from the Merit Systems Protection Board. Id. , at 8a, 34a–37a. There, he claimed the FAA had created a hostile work environment and unlawfully denied him differential pay during the time he spent serving on active duty under § 12301(d). After the Board rejected his claims, see id ., at 29a–30a, 37a, Mr. Feliciano appealed to the Federal Circuit.¶verify

On appeal, Mr. Feliciano argued that two statutes entitled him to differential pay: 5 U. S. C. § 5538(a) and 10 U. S. C. § 101(a)(13)(B). See Brief for Petitioner in No. 2022–1219 (CA Fed., Apr. 29, 2022), ECF Doc. 21, p. 19. As relevant here, § 5538(a) requires the government to provide differential pay to a federal civilian employee reservist when the military orders him to active-duty service “under . . . a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10” of the U. S. Code. Section 101(a)(13)(B), in turn, forms part of the definition of the phrase “contingency operation.” A contingency operation, that statute says, includes a “military operation that . . . results in the call or order to . . . active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 12406 of [title 10], chapter 13 of [title 10], section 3713 of title 14, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress .” (Emphasis added.) 1¶verify

Though Mr. Feliciano acknowledged that he was not called up under any of the specific statutes listed in § 101(a)(13)(B), he argued that the statute's closing words, italicized above, entitled him to differential pay. After all, the Coast Guard called him to active duty under another “provision of law” (§ 12301(d)), and his orders came “during a national emergency.” ECF Doc. 21, at 21–23. As a result, he contended, he served pursuant to a call to active duty under “a provision of law referred to in 10 U. S. C. § 101(a)(13)(B),” and was thus entitled to differential pay under § 5538(a). Id ., at 19, 23.¶verify

The Federal Circuit disagreed. Citing its earlier decision in Adams v. Department of Homeland Security , 3 F. 4th 1375 (2021), the court reasoned that, when a reservist seeks differential pay for service “during a national emergency,” he must show not only that he served on active duty while a national emergency was ongoing. He must also show a substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. Because Mr. Feliciano had not made that second showing, the court held, he was not entitled to differential pay. Id ., at 3a–4a.¶verify

1 Section 101(a)(13)(A) forms the other part of the definition of the phrase “contingency operation.” It provides that “contingency operation” also includes “a military operation that . . . is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force.” Notably, however, 5 U. S. C. § 5538(a) does not reference this provision for purposes of determining when differential pay is due.¶verify

Mr. Feliciano sought review of the Federal Circuit's decision, and we agreed to take his case. 602 U. S. 1037 (2024).¶verify

At its core, the dispute before us turns on the meaning of the phrase “during a national emergency.” Does that language promise differential pay to certain federal civilian employees called to active-duty service while a national emergency is ongoing, as Mr. Feliciano argues? Or does it require a reservist to prove some additional, substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency, as the Federal Circuit held and the government contends? Several considerations persuade us that Mr. Feliciano's interpretation is the sounder one.¶verify

A¶verify

Start with the word “during.” Normally, we have said, that word “denotes a temporal link” and means “contemporaneous with.” United States v. Ressam , 553 U. S. 272, 274275 (2008). Any number of dictionaries from around the time of § 101(a)(13)(B)'s adoption in 1991 offer up similar formulations. See, e. g. , Black's Law Dictionary 504 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “during” as “[t]hroughout the course of; throughout the continuance of; in the time of; after the commencement and before the expiration of”). 2¶verify

Conversely, the word “during” does not generally imply a substantive connection. The government itself has pre-¶verify

2 Accord, Random House Dictionary of the English Language 608 (2d ed. 1987) (during: “throughout the duration, continuance, or existence of” or “at some time or point in the course of”); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 703 (1993) (during: “throughout the continuance or course of” or “at some point in the course of”); American Heritage Dictionary 572 (3d ed. 1992) (during: “[t]hroughout the course or duration of” or “[a]t some time in”). Dictionaries from the time of § 5538's enactment in 2009 say the same. See, e. g. , American Heritage Dictionary 556 (4th ed. 2006) (during: “[t]hroughout the course or duration of” or “[a]t some time in”).¶verify

viously acknowledged as much. As its briefing in Ressam explained, “[t]he plain everyday meaning of `during' is `at the same time' or `at a point in the course of.' It does not normally mean `at the same time and in connection with .' ” Brief for United States in United States v. Ressam , O. T. 2007, No. 455, pp. 13–14 (emphasis added). Reading “during” to require a substantive connection, the government warned, risks “read[ing] in a relational element” that the word does not necessarily convey. Tr. of Oral Arg. in United States v. Ressam , O. T. 2007, No. 455, p. 31. Adopting just that view, this Court in Ressam held that a sentencing enhancement addressing those who carry an explosive “during” the commission of a felony applies to individuals who carry explosives “contemporaneous with” their felonies even in the absence of a substantive “relationship between the explosive carried and the underlying felony.” 553 U. S., at 275.¶verify

Sometimes, to be sure, statutory terms can carry meanings that depart from their ordinary ones. Congress may, for example, define a word or phrase in a specialized way or employ a term of art with long-encrusted connotations in a given field. See, e. g. , Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz , 601 U. S. 42, 5960 (2024); Sekhar v. United States , 570 U. S. 729, 733 (2013). But we have no evidence of anything like that here. And absent such evidence, those whose lives are governed by law are entitled to rely on its ordinary meaning, not left to speculate about hidden messages. See, e. g. , Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. , 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017); Niz-Chavez v. Garland , 593 U. S. 155, 163 (2021).¶verify

Given all that, we think Mr. Feliciano's reading more consistent with the statutory language before us. Just ask yourself how an ordinary American might approach the law's terms. Would he have any reason to think that a reservist called up to active duty “during” a national emergency is entitled to differential pay if, and only if, he can prove his service has a “substantive connection” to a particular emergency? We doubt it.¶verify

B¶verify

Strengthening our conviction on this score are a number of contextual clues.¶verify

First, compare the statute before us with other laws. When insisting on both a temporal and a substantive connection in other settings, Congress has commonly made its point expressly. Up and down the federal criminal code, for instance, statutes speak of actions taken “during and in relation to ” specified criminal conduct. 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also, e. g. , §§ 115(b)(1)(B)(iv), 924(c)(5), 929(a)(1). When it comes to statutes governing the Armed Forces, Congress has used the phrase “during and because of ” to describe leave both contemporaneous with and related to a reservist's active-duty service. 5 U. S. C. § 6323(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Congress, too, has exempted from certain statutory requirements the government's acquisition of land when it takes place both “ during a national emergency” and “ for national defense purposes.” 7 U. S. C. § 4208(b) (emphasis added). As these examples illustrate, Congress can and does use different words in different provisions to insist on a substantive connection. But the absence of any words hinting at a substantive connection in the statute before us supplies a telling clue that it operates differently and imposes a temporal condition alone. See Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas , 596 U. S. 685, 704 (2022).¶verify

Next, consider another provision that can trigger differential pay. Recall that the differential-pay statute—5 U. S. C. § 5538—not only works in concert with § 101(a)(13)(B) to ensure differential pay for certain reservists ordered to active duty “during a national emergency.” It also guarantees differential pay for other reservists called up under specific statutes listed in § 101(a)(13)(B). See Part I, supra . One such statute, 10 U. S. C. § 12302, authorizes the activation of various reservists “[i]n time of national emergency.” The government contends that this language speaks only temporally. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62. But if that is true and the phrase “[i]n time of a national emergency” in § 12302 requires no substantive connection, how might “during a national emergency” in § 101(a)(13)(B) do so? If a plausible explanation exists for interpreting the one phrase, but not the other, to require a substantive connection, the government does not supply it.¶verify

Notice, as well, the questions that would follow from insisting on a substantive connection here. To prove a substantive connection, the government suggests, a reservist must show that he served in support of a contingency operation while on active duty. Brief for Respondent 23–24; Tr. of Oral Arg. 75–76; post , at 71 ( Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing the same). But the Federal Circuit applies a more demanding test. On its view, a reservist must show that he served directly in a contingency operation to merit differential pay. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a; Adams , 3 F. 4th, at 1379. How might we choose between these two rules? The statute does not say. And the fact that Congress supplied no principled way to determine what kind of substantive connection is necessary strikes us as yet another sign that the law does not require any such connection.¶verify

Also relevant, to our minds, is how the parties' competing interpretations interact with 18 U. S. C. § 209. As a rule, that law makes it a crime for a private party to supplement a federal employee's salary. See § 209(a). At the same time, the statute offers an important exception: It allows a private party to offer differential pay to a reservistemployee “on active duty pursuant to a call or order to active duty under a provision of law referred to” in 10 U. S. C. § 101(a)(13). 18 U. S. C. § 209(h). On the government's reading of § 101(a)(13)(B), a private employer would apparently commit a federal crime by providing differential pay to a reservist on active-duty service while a national emergency is ongoing—unless, of course, the reservist's service bears a substantive connection to a particular national emergency. But what in the phrase “during a national emergency” tells a private employer that a substantive connection is required, let alone what sort of connection it must be? 3¶verify

Finally, adding to the case against the government's interpretation are the views of others who have come this way before us. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides cost estimates to help Members of Congress understand the likely impact of their proposed legislation. See, e. g. , Congressional Research Service, J. Saturno, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process 19 (Jan. 10, 2023). And when CBO scored potential legislation featuring terms that largely mirror those now at issue here, it based its calculations on “ the total number of reservists on active duty,” not those who are personally engaged in emergency-related duties. CBO, Cost Estimate, S. 593: Reservist Pay Security Act of 2004, pp. 2–3 (Aug. 4, 2004) (emphasis added); see also CBO, Cost Estimate, S. 2400: Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, p. 9 (July 21, 2004). Of course, no one votes for CBO reports, and courts charged with interpreting the law owe those estimates no rote deference. But CBO's approach does provide further evidence of how an ordinary reader might have understood the statutory language at issue here around the time of the differentialpay statute's adoption. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 388 (2012) (Scalia & Garner).¶verify

3 At oral argument, the government suggested that an employer who mistakenly provides differential pay to a reservist without confirming that his service has the requisite substantive connection to a particular emergency might escape liability for lack of a sufficient mens rea to warrant a conviction. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45–46; see also United States v. Project on Government Oversight , 616 F. 3d 544, 556–557 (CADC 2010). Maybe so. But that still leaves unanswered the question whether the statute fairly informs an employer what is (and is not) proscribed.¶verify

III¶verify

The government and our dissenting colleagues see things differently. They insist that the phrase “during a national emergency” requires a substantive connection between a reservist's service and a particular national emergency. To our minds, however, the government and the dissent do not adequately grapple with the textual and contextual evidence we have set forth. They give short shrift to Ressam and the ordinary meaning of the word “during.” They brush aside other statutes showing that Congress knows how to impose a substantive connection when it wishes. They do not convincingly explain how § 12302 might be read to require only a temporal connection but “during a national emergency” must be read to demand more. They discount CBO's practice. And they nowhere offer a principled basis for preferring the substantive connection they propose over the alternative the Federal Circuit offered.¶verify

To be sure, the three central arguments the government and the dissent pursue are not entirely without force. But even on their own terms, each suffers deficiencies and, to our eyes, none suffices to overcome the competing evidence of statutory meaning we have outlined.¶verify

A¶verify

The government and the dissent begin by observing that, in at least some contexts, the word “during” can imply more than a temporal connection. Brief for Respondent 14–17; see post , at 59–60 (opinion of Thomas , J .). To illustrate the point, the government asks us to imagine a statute that “referred to any attorney who argues `during' a court hearing.” Brief for Respondent 14. A reader would, the government posits, understand that language “to include only attorneys who argue in the course of the hearing—not those who argue elsewhere while the hearing happens to be occurring.” Ibid.¶verify

It's a fair observation. Context plays a vital role when interpreting statutes. And, in the context of the government's hypothetical law, we agree that an ordinary reader would understand it to require both a temporal and substantive connection between an attorney's argument and the court hearing. Really, without a substantive connection, the government's imagined statute would be meaningless, capturing any attorney who happens to argue anywhere in any forum at the same time as the ongoing hearing. The same goes for the dissent's example of a statute defining a “ `captured record' ” to mean “ `material captured during combat operations.' ” Post , at 60 (opinion of Thomas , J.) (quoting 10 U. S. C. § 427(g)(1)). There, too, an ordinary reader would understand Congress as referring only to records captured in the course of combat operations, not to all records captured while combat was ongoing somewhere, for without that substantive connection the statute would be senseless.¶verify

But we fail to see how that observation translates here. In this statutory context, a purely temporal relationship is meaningful. After all, a reservist's active-duty service during a national emergency bolsters the government's capacity to address that emergency; his work on everyday matters may free up others to handle emergent ones. Notably, the government itself argues that Congress has sometimes taken just this view, promising differential pay to certain reservists called to active duty “in time of national emergency,” whether or not their service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency. See Part II–B, supra (discussing 10 U. S. C. § 12302). In this context, then, unlike in some others, reading the word “during” to speak only temporally is perfectly sensible. 4¶verify

4 Pursuing a similar argument from statutory context, the dissent submits that, because the phrase “contingency operation” implies some “exigenc[y]” as a matter of “ordinary” usage, the word “during” must entail a substantive connection. See post , at 61–63 (opinion of Thomas, J. ). But none of that follows. The phrase “contingency operation” is subject to an¶verify

B¶verify

Next, the government and the dissent invoke the surplusage canon. If the phrase “during a national emergency” required only a temporal overlap, the government and the dissent say, it would do practically no work. After all, the argument goes, there are dozens of declared emergencies today, some have been on the books for years, and it is “unlikely that there will ever be a time when no national emergency exists.” Brief for Respondent 18–19; post , at 63–67 (opinion of Thomas , J .). The only way to give the phrase “during a national emergency” work to do, we are told, is to interpret it to require a substantive connection.¶verify

Here, again, the government and the dissent have something of a point. With the exception of a brief period in the 1970s, one declared national emergency or another has been ongoing in this country for many decades. Brief for Respondent 18; post , at 63 ( Thomas , J ., dissenting). Even so, this line of argument does not persuade us for a few reasons taken in combination.¶verify

For one thing, the surplusage canon is primarily a tool of linguistic interpretation, reflecting an assumption applicable to “all sensible writing: Whenever a reading arbitrarily ig-¶verify

express statutory definition, to which we must adhere “even if it varies from a term's ordinary meaning.” Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers , 583 U. S. 149, 160 (2018). That definition includes a military operation that results in a call to active duty under certain specifically enumerated statutory authorities or under any other law “during a national emergency.” As even the dissent admits, some of the specifically enumerated statutory authorities are “not pegged to [a] specific exigenc[y].” Post , at 62 (opinion of Thomas, J. ). By way of example, consider again 10 U. S. C. § 12302, which the government says allows it to call reservists to active duty “[i]n time of national emergency” regardless whether their service bears a substantive connection to any particular emergency. And if the specifically enumerated statutory authorities that help define a “contingency operation” do not always demand a substantive connection between a reservist's service and a particular emergency, we see no reason why the phrase “during a national emergency” must.¶verify

nores linguistic components or inadequately accounts for them, the reading may be presumed improbable.” Scalia & Garner 174 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nothing in our interpretation of § 101(a)(13)(B) defies that general rule of construction. When a reservist is called to active duty under one of the statutes enumerated in § 101(a)(13)(B), § 5538(a) guarantees him differential pay. And when a reservist is called to active duty under “any other provision of law,” he is entitled to differential pay only if a national emergency (or war) is ongoing. See 10 U. S. C. § 101(a)(13)(B); 5 U. S. C. § 5538(a). Linguistically, our reading leaves no part of the statute ignored or left without work to do.¶verify

For another, the government and dissent's practical (not linguistic) superfluity argument depends on a contingent factual assumption. Imagine Congress and the President decided tomorrow to end all existing emergencies. No one disputes that our reading of the statute would perform practically significant work in those circumstances, effectively denying differential pay to reservists called to active duty under “any other provision of law.” 10 U. S. C. § 101(a)(13)(B). But, the government and the dissent insist, we should ignore that possibility because emergencies have become an immutable feature of modern governance. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43; post , at 63 (opinion of Thomas , J .).¶verify

Maybe so, but maybe not. In the 1970s, the elected branches did something nearly like what the government today considers unthinkable. In 1976, Congress passed and President Ford signed the National Emergencies Act, which effectively ended then-existing emergencies and established procedures for declaring (and concluding) new ones. See 90 Stat. 1255 (codified at 50 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq .); Congressional Research Service, E. Webster, National Emergency Powers 7–11 (Nov. 19, 2021). In spite of that intervention, of course, the number of declared emergencies has only grown in the years since. But history may yet repeat itself, even if the government today considers the prospect “unlikely.” Brief for Respondent 19. And it is unclear why we should overlook the most natural linguistic interpretation of this statute's terms based on an assumption that prevailing factual conditions will never change. What is a present fact of the world is not necessarily a permanent one.¶verify

For another thing still, the government and dissent's approach invites its own superfluity problems. A number of statutes tie a governmental power or duty to the existence of some ongoing national emergency. For example, Congress has made certain contracting authorities available to the Executive Branch “during a national emergency.” 50 U. S. C. § 1435. And, as we have seen, Congress has promised differential pay to certain other reservists called to active duty “[i]n time of national emergency.” See Part II–B, supra . The government maintains that these statutes do not require a substantive connection, only a temporal overlap, with a national emergency. See Brief for Respondent 30; Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62. Yet, under the government and dissent's view, Congress was wasting its breath with superfluous language in all these laws. A more natural inference, we believe, is that Congress sometimes considers a purely temporal link with a national emergency a salient condition on governmental powers and duties, even if that condition will often be satisfied.¶verify

Finally, even if we could somehow overcome all of these problems, we would only find ourselves facing again the question of what kind of substantive tie a reservist's service must have to a national emergency. And, as we have discussed, the statute supplies no obviously principled way for us to resolve what that connection might be. See Part IIB, supra . 5¶verify

5 The dissent also insists that our reading would render superfluous various postenactment amendments that have expanded the list of provisions enumerated in § 101(a)(13)(B). Post , at 65–67 (opinion of Thomas, J .). That argument is mistaken for reasons already discussed: Each of the¶verify

C¶verify

Failing all else, the government and the dissent worry that our interpretation would invite anomalous policy consequences. Brief for Respondent 22; post , at 68 (opinion of Thomas , J.) (expressing concern about the potential “ripple effects” of our decision). So, for example, the government fears that a purely temporal reading of the phrase “during a national emergency” might require it to provide differential pay to a reservist called to active duty to face a court-martial. Brief for Respondent 22–23. Likewise, the government says, our reading could require differential pay for a reservist called up to attend “training for new Judge Advocates at the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, Virginia.” Id ., at 23.¶verify

But what does any of that prove? When a party claims that a law yields anomalous policy consequences, its usual recourse lies in Congress, not in the courts where litigants are generally entitled to expect that statutes will “be enforced as written.” Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U. S. 497, 525 (2018); see also Patel v. Garland , 596 U. S. 328, 346 (2022) (“[P]olicy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statutory text”).¶verify

amendments the dissent cites promises differential pay even in the absence of any national emergency. The only possible exception concerns an amendment that, among other things, authorized differential pay retroactively for certain members of the Coast Guard for a single year, a year in which there was already an ongoing national emergency. Post , at 66 ( Thomas , J ., dissenting) (discussing § 681(a), 126 Stat. 1795). But even assuming that one aspect of that single amendment may represent “some redundancy” on our account of § 101(a)(13)(B), the dissent's interpretation results in redundancies of its own and encounters so many other difficulties that we think the “better overall reading of the statute” remains the one we pursue. Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. , 586 U. S. 334, 346 (2019).¶verify

Nor, even taken on their own terms, are the potential consequences the government highlights all that anomalous. Members of the Armed Forces facing court-martial are entitled to their military wages until convicted, 10 U. S. C. § 857(a)(1), and they are presumed innocent until proven guilty, § 851(c)(1). In light of those statutory directions, it is hardly absurd to think Congress might have also wanted a reservist to receive differential pay when called to active duty to answer a court-martial that might acquit him. Much the same goes for reservists called to active duty for training. Whether that training entails learning the finer points of the Uniform Code of Military Justice or attending Airborne School, well-trained reservists are ones the Nation can call on at a moment's notice, as it often has. See, e. g. , Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 20 (“Within minutes of the September 11 attacks, National Guard and Reservists responded to the call to duty”). 6¶verify

*¶verify

In the end, we are persuaded that the statutory language means what its terms most naturally suggest: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” is entitled to differential pay without having to prove that his service¶verify

6 The dissent expresses concern that our interpretation might lead to other “untold consequences,” like expanding the “availability of civilian court[s]-martial” or exempting the Department of Defense from having to notify Congress before entering into certain real-estate transactions. Post , at 63 (opinion of Thomas , J.) (citing 10 U. S. C. §§ 802(a)(10) and 2662(f)(1)(E)). We express no views on the dissent's claims except to observe two things. First, as the dissent acknowledges, considerations of constitutional avoidance might counsel in favor of a narrowing construction of certain laws governing courts-martial. See post , at 63 (opinion of Thomas , J .). Second, the result the dissent posits with respect to realestate transactions is neither unthinkable nor something Congress could not alter to the extent the Constitution allows.¶verify

was substantively connected in some particular way to some particular emergency. Because the Federal Circuit held otherwise, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.¶verify

It is so ordered.¶verify