Parrish v. United States

Justice Gorsuch , dissenting.¶verify

Respectfully, I would have dismissed this case as improvidently granted. The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has already launched a study to consider whether changes to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) may be warranted to treat premature notices of appeal as relating forward to the first day of the 14-day window 28 U. S. C. § 2107(c) prescribes. Brief in Opposition 16; see also Winters v. Taskila , 88 F. 4th 665, 671–672 (CA6 2023). Surely, too, a change to the rules could have solved the problem presented by this case. Contra, ante, at 387, n. 3. Even if § 2107(c) requires a notice to be filed during a certain window, the Rules Committee could provide that a premature notice shall be treated as filed at a later date. Already, the Committee has done exactly that in other appellate rules, including Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4). See Advisory Committee's Notes on 1979 Amendments, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 10. Rather than take up problems the Rules Committee can solve and has announced its interest in solving—and, in doing so, risk the possibility that the Committee (understandably) may suspend its own activities and delay their resolution—I believe the wiser and more efficient course is to let the Committee get on with its work. That body is charged with “review[ing] issues of precisely this sort.” Winters , 88 F. 4th, at 672; see also Kemp v. United States , 596 U. S. 528, 540542 (2022) ( Gorsuch, J. , dissenting).¶verify