Erlinger v. United States

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.¶

This case concerns the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ACCA imposes lengthy mandatory prison terms on certain defendants who have previously committed three violent felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions. The question we face is whether a judge may decide that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, or whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make that determination beyond a reasonable doubt.¶

I¶

In 2017, the federal government charged Paul Erlinger under 18 U. S. C. §922(g) with being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm. At the time, a conviction for that offense ordinarily carried a sentence of up to 10 years in prison. §924(a)(2) (2012 ed.). But the government also charged Mr. Erlinger under ACCA. And under that statute, a defendant found guilty of violating §922(g) can face even more severe punishment. Specifically, if the defendant has three prior convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s]” that were “committed on occasions different from one another,” ACCA increases the prison term he faces to a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life. §924(e)(1) (2012 ed.).¶

Mr. Erlinger pleaded guilty to violating §922(g). But in doing so, he stressed that his previous convictions were more than a decade old and since then he had turned his life around, secured a steady job, built a family, and remained free from drugs. Tr. of Plea and Sentencing Hearing in No. 2:18–cr–00013 (SD Ind., Oct. 24, 2018), ECF Doc. 67, p. 24. In light of these facts, the sentencing judge stated that a 5-year prison term would represent a “fair sentence.” Id. , at 30. But the judge also found it more likely than not that Mr. Erlinger’s past included three ACCA-qualifying offenses committed on three different occasions. Id. , at 17. And based on that finding, the court concluded, it had no authority to issue a 5-year sentence. Id. , at 29–30. Instead, ACCA required a sentence of at least 15 years. That was “too high” for Mr. Erlinger’s crime, the court emphasized, but it had “no power” to order anything less. Ibid.¶

Shortly after the court issued a 15-year sentence consistent with ACCA, the ground shifted. The Seventh Circuit issued decisions indicating that two of the three offenses on which the district court had relied to invoke ACCA did not qualify as “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s].” 77 F. 4th 617, 619 (2023) (citing United States v. Glispie , 978 F. 3d 502 (2020), and United States v. De La Torre , 940 F. 3d 938 (2019)). That left Mr. Erlinger with only one qualifying prior conviction, not the three ACCA requires. Recognizing as much, the district court vacated its sentence and set the case for a new sentencing hearing. Order, ECF Doc. 81.¶

There, prosecutors once more pursued a 15-year ACCA sentence. This time, though, they pointed to a new set of prior convictions arising from burglaries Mr. Erlinger committed when he was 18 years old—some 26 years before his¶

§922(g) charge. Tr. of Video Resentencing Hearing, ECF Doc. 120, at 37–38. As the government told it, within a span of days Mr. Erlinger burglarized a pizza shop, a sporting goods store, and two restaurants. Ibid. Because each of these burglaries occurred on different occasions, the government submitted, each could serve as an ACCA predicate and collectively they could support an ACCA sentence. Id. , at 39–40.¶

Mr. Erlinger protested. He maintained that his decadesold burglaries had not occurred on four separate occasions but during a single criminal episode, all of which meant he still lacked the three prior offenses ACCA requires. Id. , at 20. More than that, Mr. Erlinger argued, the question whether he committed his prior burglaries during a single episode or on distinct occasions required an assessment of the facts surrounding those offenses. Id. , at 22–23. And, he contended, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitled him to have a jury make that assessment. Id. , at 23.¶

The district court rejected Mr. Erlinger’s request for a jury. It proceeded to find for itself that each of his 26-yearold burglaries occurred on distinct occasions. Id. , at 48–49. Armed with this finding, the court held that Mr. Erlinger had at least three previous ACCA-qualifying offenses and once more issued a 15-year sentence. Again, the court said that it thought the result “unfortunate” and “excessive.” Id. , at 50. But, again, it said ACCA left it no choice. Id. , at 50–51.¶

On appeal, Mr. Erlinger renewed his argument that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitled him to have a jury decide whether his burglaries occurred on different occasions. But this time, the government confessed error. The Constitution, it said, “requires a jury” to decide unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt whether Mr. Erlinger’s ACCA predicates were ''committed on occasions different from one another.'' 77 F. 4th, at 619, 620.¶

In explaining its turnabout, the government pointed to this Court’s recent decision in Wooden v. United States , 595 U. S. 360 (2022). That decision did not directly address whether a judge may, or a jury must, resolve disputes about whether multiple crimes occurred on multiple occasions. Id ., at 365, n. 3; see id. , at 397, n. 7 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). But, the government acknowledged, Wooden did hold that ACCA’s occasions “inquiry” can require an examination of a “range” of facts, including whether the defendant’s past offenses were “committed close in time,” whether they were committed near to or far from one another, and whether the offenses were “similar or intertwined” in purpose and character. Id. , at 369. And given the intensely factual nature of this inquiry and the impact its resolution can have on a defendant’s sentence, the government admitted, a jury must resolve it. That conclusion, the government represented, flows directly from this Court’s consistent holdings that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments generally guarantee a defendant the right to have a unanimous jury find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases his exposure to punishment. Brief for United States in No. 22–1926 (CA7), pp. 9–11.¶

Despite the government’s concession, the Seventh Circuit refused to disturb the district court’s sentence. 77 F. 4th, at 621–622. That left Mr. Erlinger to petition this Court for certiorari. The government filed a brief in support of his petition. In it, the government argued that a number of courts of appeals have refused requests for juries in cases like Mr. Erlinger’s and that “this Court’s intervention is necessary to ensure that the circuits correctly recognize defendants’ constitutional rights in this context.” Brief for United States on Pet. for Cert. 5–6.¶

We agreed to take up Mr. Erlinger’s case to decide whether ACCA’s occasions inquiry must be resolved by a jury. 601 U. S. ___ (2023). Because the government now agrees with Mr. Erlinger about the proper resolution of that question, we appointed Nick Harper to defend the judgment below as amicus curiae . 601 U. S. ___ (2023). He has ably discharged his responsibilities.¶

II A¶

Prominent among the reasons colonists cited in the Declaration of Independence for their break with Great Britain was the fact Parliament and the Crown had “depriv[ed] [them] in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.” ¶20. For centuries, English law had recognized the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana , 391 U. S. 145, 151 (1968). Yet, as tensions grew between the British Empire and its American Colonies, imperial authorities responded by stripping away that ancient right. By their lights, colonial juries ''were not to be trusted'' because they found for defendants too often. D. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 17641776, 16 Wm. & Mary Q. 459, 468 (1959). To secure more vigorous enforcement of the Stamp Act and other unpopular laws, authorities directed more and more cases to viceadmiralty courts where crown-appointed judges, rather than local juries, decided the defendant’s fate. Jones v. United States , 526 U. S. 227, 245–246 (1999). Just as authorities hoped, the tactic proved ''most effective'' at securing the verdicts they wished. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U. S. 322, 340, n. 3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 11 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 110 (1966)).¶

After securing their independence, the founding generation sought to ensure what happened before would not happen again. As John Adams put it, the founders saw representative government and trial by jury as “the heart and lungs” of liberty. Letter from Clarendon to W. Pym (Jan. 27, 1766), in 1 Papers of John Adams 169 (R. Taylor ed. 1977). “[W]ithout them,” he wrote, we “have no other fortification . . . against being ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and clothed like swine and hounds.” Ibid . Reflecting that sentiment, the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was, on one telling, the only right included in every newly enacted state constitution. A. Alschuler & A. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 870 (1994).¶

Those who drafted our Federal Constitution took just as strong a stand on the jury trial right. As originally proposed, the Constitution promised that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.” Art. III, §2, cl. 3. In the ratification debates that followed, some questioned the adequacy of this provision; even with it, they feared, the new federal government might fall prey to the kinds of temptations that led the British to restrict the jury trial right in the colonies. That right, they argued, had to be “guard[ed] with the most jealous circumspection.” A [New Hampshire] Farmer, No. 3, June 6, 1788, quoted in The Complete Bill of Rights 681 (N. Cogan 2d ed. 2015) (internal quotation marks and italics omitted). To address this and other concerns about the new Constitution, James Madison agreed to draft a series of amendments we now know as the Bill of Rights. No fewer than three of those ten amendments touch on the right to trial by jury, two with implications for criminal cases. Amdts. 5, 6, 7. Madison himself described protections for the jury trial right as among “the most valuable” that appear in “the whole list” of amendments he produced. 1 Annals of Cong. 755 (1789).¶

The Sixth Amendment promises that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused” has “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” Inhering in that guarantee is an assurance that a guilty verdict will issue only from a unanimous jury. Ramos v. Louisiana , 590 U. S. 83, 93 (2020). The Fifth Amendment further promises that the government may not deprive individuals of their liberty without “due process of law.” It is a promise that safeguards for criminal defendants those procedural protections well established at common law, including the “ancient rule” that the government must prove to a jury every one of its charges beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Haymond , 588 U. S. 634, 641 (2019) (plurality opinion); see Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U. S. 466, 477–478 (2000); United States v. Gaudin , 515 U. S. 506, 510 (1995); Sullivan v. Louisiana , 508 U. S. 275, 277–278 (1993).¶

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments placed the jury at the heart of our criminal justice system. From the start, those provisions were understood to require the government to include in its criminal charges ''all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offence.'' Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 478 (quoting J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 44 (15th ed. 1862)). Should an “indictment or ‘accusation . . . lack any particular fact which the laws ma[d]e essential to the punishment,’ it was treated as ‘no accusation’ at all.” Haymond , 588 U. S., at 642 (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure §87, p. 55 (2d ed. 1872) (some alterations omitted)). And at all times the ''truth of every accusation'' against a defendant had to be ''confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [his] equals and neighbours.'' Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 477 (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343 (1769); emphasis deleted).¶

Equally, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments sought to ensure that a judge’s power to punish would “deriv[e] wholly” from, and remain always “control[led]” by, the jury and its verdict. Blakely v. Washington , 542 U. S. 296, 306 (2004). Ordinarily, common-law crimes carried “specific sanctions, and ‘[o]nce the facts of the offense were determined by the jury, the judge was meant simply to impose the prescribed sentence.'' Haymond , 588 U. S., at 642 (quoting Alleyne v. United States , 570 U. S. 99, 108 (2013) (plurality opinion)). Even when it came to early American statutes that gave judges a measure of discretion in selecting among possible sentences, “the ranges themselves were linked to particular facts” found by the jury. Alleyne , 570 U. S., at 109 (collecting examples). All of which guaranteed that a judge could not ''swell the penalty above what the law . . . provided for the acts'' found by a jury of the defendant’s peers. Haymond , 588 U. S., at 642 (quoting Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 519 (THOMAS, J., concurring)).¶

These principles represent not “procedural formalit[ies]” but “fundamental reservation[s] of power” to the American people. Blakely , 542 U. S., at 305–306. By requiring the Executive Branch to prove its charges to a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments seek to mitigate the risk of prosecutorial overreach and misconduct, including the pursuit of “pretended offenses” and “arbitrary convictions.” The Federalist No. 83, p. 499 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); accord, Federal Farmer, Letter XV (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 320 (H. Storing ed. 1981). By requiring a unanimous jury to find every fact essential to an offender’s punishment, those amendments similarly seek to constrain the Judicial Branch, ensuring that the punishments courts issue are not the result of a judicial “inquisition” but are premised on laws adopted by the people’s elected representatives and facts found by members of the community. Blakely , 542 U. S., at 307; Haymond , 588 U. S., at 640–641. Both of these checks on governmental power, the framers appreciated, were “anchor[s]” essential to prevent a slide back toward regimes like the vice-admiralty courts they so despised. Letter from T. Jefferson to T. Paine (July 11, 1789), reprinted in 15 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 266, 269 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).¶

With the passage of time, and accelerating in earnest in the 20th century, various governments in this country sought to experiment with new trial and sentencing practices. See Mistretta v. United States , 488 U. S. 361, 363367 (1989); Williams v. New York , 337 U. S. 241, 247–248¶

(1949); see also P. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 528, 529–532 (1958). But in case after case, this Court has cautioned that, while some experiments may be tolerable, all must remain within the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ guardrails.¶

So, for example, in Apprendi this Court faced a case involving a New Jersey offense that ordinarily carried a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. 530 U. S., at 468. The State, however, had adopted a novel “sentencing enhancement” that purported to allow a judge to impose an even longer term of imprisonment after finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the offender’s crime was motivated by racial bias. Id ., at 468–471. Relying on that statutory authority, the sentencing judge ordered the defendant to serve 12 years in prison. Id. , at 471. This Court found the sentence unconstitutional, and did so for a by-now familiar reason: Only a jury may find ''facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.'' Id. , at 490.¶

It is a principle we have since reiterated in response to a variety of other recent sentencing innovations. See Haymond , 588 U. S., at 644 (collecting cases). And it is a principle, we have observed, that does not just apply when a judge seeks to issue a sentence that exceeds the maximum penalty authorized by a jury’s findings (or a guilty plea). It is a principle that also applies when a judge seeks to increase a defendant’s minimum punishment. Alleyne illustrates the point. There, we confronted a case in which a jury had convicted the defendant of a crime that usually carried a sentence of between five years and life in prison. 570 U. S., at 103–104. But a separate statutory “sentencing enhancement” ostensibly allowed the judge to transform that 5-year minimum sentence into a 7-year minimum sentence if he found a certain additional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Ibid. That innovation, too, the Court held, improperly invaded the jury’s province because “[a] fact that increases” a defendant’s exposure to punishment, whether by triggering a higher maximum or minimum sentence, must “be submitted to a jury” and found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. Id ., at 111–113.¶

The principles Apprendi and Alleyne discussed are so firmly entrenched that we have now overruled several decisions inconsistent with them. See, e.g. , Hurst v. Florida , 577 U. S. 92, 101–102 (2016) (overruling Hildwin v. Florida , 490 U. S. 638 (1989) ( per curiam ), and Spaziano v. Florida , 468 U. S. 447 (1984)); Alleyne , 570 U. S., at 107 (overruling Harris v. United States , 536 U. S. 545 (2002)); Ring v. Arizona , 536 U. S. 584, 609 (2002) (overruling Walton v. Arizona , 497 U. S. 639 (1990)).¶

B¶

Commendably, the government concedes before us, as it did before the court of appeals, what all this means for Mr. Erlinger’s case and others like it. Under §922(g), Mr. Erlinger faced between 0 and 10 years in prison. §924(a)(2) (2012 ed.). To trigger ACCA and expose him to longer prison terms, the government had to prove that his past included three convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s]” that were “committed on occasions different from one another.” §924(e)(1). And under Wooden , deciding whether those past offenses occurred on three or more different occasions is a fact-laden task. Were the crimes “committed close in time”? 595 U. S., at 369. How about the “[p]roximity” of their “location[s]”? Ibid. Were the offenses “similar or intertwined” in purpose and character? Ibid. All these questions, Wooden observed, “may be relevant” to determining whether the offenses were committed on one occasion or separate ones—and all require facts to be found before ACCA’s more punitive mandatory minimum sentence may be lawfully deployed. Ibid.¶

As the government recognizes, there is no doubt what the Constitution requires in these circumstances: Virtually¶

“any fact” that ''increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed'' must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea). Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 490; see Brief for United States 9. Judges may not assume the jury’s factfinding function for themselves, let alone purport to perform it using a mere preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. To hold otherwise might not portend a revival of the vice-admiralty courts the framers so feared. See Part II–A, supra . But all the same, it would intrude on a power the Fifth and Sixth Amendments reserve to the American people.¶

Really, this case is as nearly on all fours with Apprendi and Alleyne as any we might imagine. In Apprendi , a judge relied on his own factual findings under a preponderanceof-the-evidence standard to increase the defendant’s maximum sentence from 10 to 20 years. 530 U. S., at 469. In Alleyne , a judge proceeded the same way to increase the defendant’s minimum sentence from five to seven years. 570 U. S., at 104. Here, the sentencing court’s factual finding that Mr. Erlinger’s offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions had the effect of increasing both the maximum and minimum sentences he faced. Rather than a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison, the judge’s finding left Mr. Erlinger exposed to life in prison. Rather than a minimum penalty of no prison time, the judge’s finding meant Mr. Erlinger had to serve at least 15 years.¶

While recognizing Mr. Erlinger was entitled to have a jury resolve ACCA’s occasions inquiry unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, we decide no more than that. For purposes of the proceedings before us, the parties take as given that Mr. Erlinger committed four burglaries and that each qualifies as a “violent offense” under ACCA. But they disagree vigorously about whether those burglaries took place on at least three different occasions (so that ACCA’s enhanced sentences would apply) or during a single criminal episode (so that they would not). Presented with evidence about the times, locations, purpose, and character of those crimes, a jury might have concluded that some or all occurred on different occasions. Or it might not have done so. All we can say for certain is that the sentencing court erred in taking that decision from a jury of Mr. Erlinger’s peers. 1¶

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1 JUSTICE JACKSON pursues an argument neither the government nor amicus nor the principal dissent attempts. She says Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U. S. 466 (2000), “was wrongly decided,” and all but calls on the Court to overturn our many precedents applying it, post , at 1, and n. 1, 10–18. But rather than meaningfully engage with the Constitution, its original meaning and history, or our precedents, JUSTICE JACKSON would abandon “constitutional theory” and appeal to a different authority. Post , at 27. “In my view,” post , at 20, JUSTICE JACKSON contends, juries cannot “deal with the fine-grained, nuanced determinations . . . that are necessary to fairly adjudicate factual questions like the one that ACCA’s occasions inquiry raises,” post , at 23. But the Constitution does not take such a dim view about the capacity of jurors or the rigors of trial. Surely, too, juries are no less capable than judges to decide whether three past events happened on three separate occasions. Day in and day out, using everyday trial procedures, juries decide exponentially more complex questions than that. Nor, of course, does Apprendi prohibit legislatures from enacting reforms authorizing judges to lower sentences based on their own factfinding. See, e.g. , First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115391, 132 Stat. 5194; 18 U. S. C. §3553(f ) (doing just that). The only thing judges may not do consistent with Apprendi is increase a defendant’s exposure to punishment based on their own factfinding. All of which leaves JUSTICE JACKSON with her real complaint: In her view, it is “wildly inefficient” to require the government to call witnesses and present evidence—which is to say prove its case—when a judge might more easily enhance a defendant’s exposure to punishment by consulting “sometimes-decades-old,” post , at 23, and error-prone court records, infra , at 17–19. But does JUSTICE JACKSON really think it too much to ask the government to prove its case (as it concedes it must) with reliable evidence before seeking enhanced punishments under a statute like ACCA when the “practical realit[y]” for defendants like Mr. Erlinger is exposure to an additional decade (or more) in prison? Post , at 27. JUSTICE JACKSON may view juries as “roadblocks” to higher punishments. Post , at 18. But¶

III A¶

The Court-appointed amicus resists the conclusion we reach. Unlike JUSTICE JACKSON, see n. 1, supra , however, amicus does not dispute the Constitution’s time-honored guarantee that a unanimous jury ordinarily must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases a defendant’s exposure to punishment. See Brief for CourtAppointed Amicus Curiae 1. In defending the decision below, amicus relies instead on an exception to that rule this Court announced in Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U. S. 224 (1998). On amicus ’s telling, that exception permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses, including whether he committed them on different occasions. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 10. The principal dissent presses the same line of argument. Post , at 5 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).¶

We disagree. In Almendarez-Torres , the Court considered sentencing laws applicable to aliens who returned to the United States after a previous removal. The default sentencing range was up to two years of imprisonment. 8 U. S. C. §1326(a) (1994 ed.). But a finding that the government previously removed the alien after a “conviction for commission of an aggravated felony” triggered a new maximum penalty of up to 20 years in prison. §1326(b) (1994 ed.). In Almendarez-Torres , the Court permitted a judge to undertake the job of finding the fact of a prior convictionand that job alone. 523 U. S., at 246–247.¶

Almost immediately, too, the decision came under scrutiny. Jones , 526 U. S., at 249, n. 10. The Court has since described Almendarez-Torres as “at best an exceptional departure” from “historic practice.” Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 487. That decision, we have said, parted ways from the¶

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“[t]he bottom line is this”: the people ratified the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, not any of our personal views. Post , at 27.¶

“uniform course of decision during the entire history of our jurisprudence.” Id. , at 490. It was “arguabl[y] . . . incorrec[t].” Id. , at 489. And it amounted to an “unusual . . . exception to the Sixth Amendment rule in criminal cases that ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime’ must be proved to a jury.” Pereida v. Wilkinson , 592 U. S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 490).¶

In separate opinions, a number of Justices have criticized Almendarez-Torres further yet, and JUSTICE THOMAS, whose vote was essential to the majority in that case, has called for it to be overruled. See, e.g. , Mathis v. United States , 579 U. S. 500, 522 (2016) (THOMAS, J., concurring); Descamps v. United States , 570 U. S. 254, 280 (2013) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment); Shepard v. United States , 544 U. S. 13, 27 (2005) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Jones , 526 U. S., at 252–253 (Stevens, J., concurring); Monge v. California , 524 U. S. 721, 741 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).¶

Still, no one in this case has asked us to revisit AlmendarezTorres . Nor is there need to do so today. In the years since that decision, this Court has expressly delimited its reach. It persists as a “narrow exception” permitting judges to find only “the fact of a prior conviction.” Alleyne , 570 U. S., at 111, n. 1. Under that exception, a judge may “do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.” Mathis , 579 U. S., at 511–512. We have reiterated this limit on the scope of Almendarez-Torres “over and over,” to the point of “downright tedium.” 579 U. S., at 510, 519. 2 And so understood, Almendarez-Torres does nothing¶

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2 See Pereida v. Wilkinson , 592 U. S. 224, 238 (2021); United States v. Haymond , 588 U. S. 634, 644, n. 3 (2019) (plurality opinion); Descamps v. United States , 570 U. S. 254, 269 (2013); Cunningham v. California , 549 U. S. 270, 282 (2007); Shepard v. United States , 544 U. S. 13, 24¶

to save the sentence in this case. To determine whether Mr. Erlinger’s prior convictions triggered ACCA’s enhanced penalties, the district court had to do more than identify his previous convictions and the legal elements required to sustain them. It had to find that those offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions. And, in doing so, the court did more than Almendarez-Torres allows.¶

B¶

Perhaps, amicus replies, but perhaps not. If AlmendarezTorres permits a judge to find “what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of,” Mathis , 579 U. S., at 511–512, amicus reasons, that necessarily implies a judge may also find the jurisdiction in which the underlying offense occurred and the date it happened. Brief for CourtAppointed Amicus Curiae 29. And, amicus continues, in at least some (but admittedly not all) cases, knowing those facts will make the occasions inquiry so ''straightforward'' that sending it to a jury would be pointlessly inefficient. Id. , at 39–40.¶

Again, we disagree. To conduct the narrow inquiry Almendarez-Torres authorizes, a court may need to know the jurisdiction in which the defendant’s crime occurred and its date in order to ascertain what legal elements the government had to prove to secure a conviction in that place at that time. And to answer those questions, a sentencing court may sometimes consult “a restricted set of materials,” often called Shepard documents, that include judicial records, plea agreements, and colloquies between a judge and¶

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(2005) (plurality opinion); United States v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 244 (2005); Blakely v. Washington , 542 U. S. 296, 301 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U. S. 466, 490 (2000). The principal dissent complains that some of these decisions “did not involve recidivism” questions. Post , at 7 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). But surely our consistent explanations of Almendarez-Torres ’s reach cannot be so casually dismissed. Perhaps especially when those explanations were repeated in multiple cases that did “involve recidivism,” such as Shepard , Descamps , and Mathis .¶

the defendant. Descamps , 570 U. S., at 262; see Shepard , 544 U. S., at 20–21, 26; Taylor v. United States , 495 U. S. 575, 602 (1990).¶

None of that, however, means that a court may use Shepard documents or any other materials for any other purpose. To ensure compliance with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, a sentencing judge may use the information he gleans from Shepard documents for the “limited function” of determining the fact of a prior conviction and the then-existing elements of that offense. Descamps , 570 U. S., at 260. “[N]o more” is allowed. Mathis , 579 U. S., at 511. In particular, a judge may not use information in Shepard documents to decide “what the defendant . . . actually d[id],” or the “means” or “manner” in which he committed his offense in order to increase the punishment to which he might be exposed. 579 U. S . , at 504, 510–511; see Descamps , 570 U. S., at 269. To sanction that practice would be to allow a sentencing court to do exactly what the Fifth and Sixth Amendments forbid. Ibid.¶

The sentencing court in this case disregarded these constraints. To determine what legal elements attached to Mr. Erlinger’s decades-old offenses, the court might have needed to consult Shepard documents to ascertain the jurisdiction in which they occurred and the date on which they happened. But the court had no need or authority “to go any further,” Mathis , 579 U. S., at 511, and assume for itself the responsibility of deciding whether Mr. Erlinger’s past offenses differed enough in time, location, character, and purpose to have transpired on different occasions. Let alone undertake that inquiry all with an eye toward increasing his punishment. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments “contemplat[e] that a jury—not a sentencing courtwill find such facts, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Descamps , 570 U. S., at 269. 3¶

Other considerations fortify our conclusion. Often, as amicus concedes, Shepard documents will not contain all the information needed to conduct a sensible ACCA occasions inquiry, such as the exact times and locations of the defendant’s past crimes. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 40. Even when Shepard documents do contain that kind of granular information, more still may be required. After all, this Court has held that no particular lapse of time or distance between offenses automatically separates a single occasion from distinct ones. Wooden , 595 U. S., at 369–370. Often, a qualitative assessment about “the character and relationship” of the offenses may be required. Id. , at 369. So may an inquiry into whether the crimes shared “a common scheme or purpose.” Ibid.¶

Not only are Shepard documents of limited utility, they can be “prone to error.” Mathis , 579 U. S., at 512; see also Brief for National Association of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae 8–15 (NAFD Brief ) (recounting examples of material errors); post , at 25 (opinion of JACKSON, J.) (acknowledging records are “imperfect” and may contain “material gaps”). The risk of error may be especially grave when it comes to facts recounted in Shepard documents on which adversarial testing was “unnecessary” in the prior proceeding. Mathis , 579 U. S., at 512. As we have recognized, “[a]t trial, and still more at plea hearings, a defendant may have¶

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3 The principal dissent dismisses our precedents restricting the materials and facts judges can consider on the ground that those decisions did not “purpor[t] to articulate any Sixth Amendment holding.” Post , at 8 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). But, as the government recognizes, this Court did address the Sixth Amendment and “meant what it said.” See Reply Brief for United States 7. As the Court has said before and we hold again today: “[A] judge cannot go beyond identifying the crime of conviction to explore the manner in which the defendant committed that offense. . . . He can do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.” Mathis v. United States , 579 U. S. 500, 511–512 (2016).¶

no incentive to contest what does not matter” to his conviction at the time. Ibid . He may even ''have good reason not to’ ” haggle over seemingly immaterial errors in his judicial records. Ibid. (quoting Descamps , 570 U. S., at 270) .¶

Those realities counsel caution in the use of Shepard documents. At the time of his prior conviction, a defendant might not have cared if a judicial record contained a mistake about, say, the time or location of his offense. Back then, fine details like those might not have mattered a bit to his guilt or innocence. Contesting them needlessly, too, might have risked squandering the patience and good will of a jury or the judge responsible for pronouncing a sentence. Yet, years later and faced with an ACCA charge, those kinds of details can carry with them life-altering consequences. For Mr. Erlinger, they may mean perhaps 10 more years in prison. As a matter of fair notice alone, old recorded details, prone to error, sometimes untested, often inessential, and the consequences of which a defendant may not have appreciated at the time, “should not come back to haunt [him] many years down the road by triggering a lengthy mandatory sentence.” 579 U. S., at 512; see also Jones , 526 U. S., at 249.¶

We do not question amicus ’s assessment that in many cases the occasions inquiry will be ''straightforward.'' Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 39. Often, a defendant’s past offenses will be different enough and separated by enough time and space that there is little question he committed them on separate occasions. But none of that means a judge rather than a jury should make the call. There is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In a free society respectful of the individual, a criminal defendant enjoys the right to hold the government to the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt to a unanimous jury of his peers ''regardless of how overwhelmin[g]'' the evidence may seem to a judge. Rose v. Clark , 478 U. S. 570, 578 (1986). 4¶

C¶

Amicus next asks us to turn from doctrine to history. While our precedents have consistently read AlmendarezTorres as permitting a judge to find only the fact of a prior conviction and the elements required to sustain it, he insists our precedents are mistaken. Properly understood, he submits, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ original meaning and “deep” common-law traditions authorize judges at sentencing to find all manner of facts about an offender’s past crimes. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 7.¶

We have been down this road before. In Apprendi , the Court carefully studied the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and found that almost “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed¶

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4 The principal dissent stresses that, despite our repeated admonitions about the limitations associated with the use of Shepard materials, “all 12 Courts of Appeals” have permitted judges to use them to resolve the occasions inquiry. Post , at 6 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). But most of the decisions the dissent cites issued before Wooden ’s clarification about the nature of the occasions inquiry, a clarification even the government now recognizes means a jury is required. And to the extent some lower courts have continued to allow judges to resolve occasions inquiries even after Wooden v. United States , 595 U. S. 360 (2022), it seems confusion about Almendarez-Torres has played a role in their misapprehension about what the Constitution requires. See, e.g. , United States v. Stowell , 82 F. 4th 607, 611 (CA8 2023) (en banc) (Erickson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for treating as “a foregone conclusion” that a judge may continue to find facts not proved to the jury to decide the occasions inquiry); United States v. Brown , 77 F. 4th 301, 301–302 (CA4 2023) (statement of Heytens, J.) (noting the “uncertain scope of Almendarez-Torres ”); id., at 302 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part) (conceding “different approach[es]” exist “as to the scope of Almendarez-Torres ”); id ., at 303 (Wynn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (questioning “the continuing viability of Almendarez-Torres ”); see also United States v. Dudley , 5 F. 4th 1249, 1278 (CA11 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).¶

statutory maximum” was understood at the time of the Nation’s founding to be a fact a jury must find. 530 U. S., at 490; see also id. , at 499–512 (THOMAS, J., concurring). In the years since, we have come to the same conclusion in one decision after another. See, e.g. , Mathis , 579 U. S., at 510; supra , at 10 (collecting cases).¶

To reconsider all those precedents now would require, at the least, proof “convincing indeed.” Gaudin , 515 U. S., at 515. Yet amicus offers nothing like that. He points to the “supplemental-information” procedures a few States employed “in the early 19th century.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 15. Those procedures allowed prosecutors seeking enhanced penalties premised on a defendant’s past convictions to charge them in “a supplemental, post-conviction information,” rather than in “a pre-conviction indictment.” Ibid. And, amicus stresses, this Court upheld one State’s supplemental-information scheme in G raham v. West Virginia , 224 U. S. 616 (1912). The principal dissent echoes the same points. Post , at 14–16 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).¶

But, if anything, the evidence amicus cites does more to hurt than help his cause. For one thing, a sentencing procedure followed by a few States hardly represents “convincing” proof that our precedents have mistaken the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Gaudin , 515 U. S., at 515; see id ., at 519. For another, when this Court upheld one of these supplemental-information schemes in Graham , it stressed that, under the law’s terms, even “the fact of former conviction” had to be “charged” by prosecutors and then “determined by a jury in a proceeding thereby instituted.” 224 U. S., at 630. Put those points together and amicus ’s evidence provides perhaps more reason to question Almendarez-Torres ’s narrow exception than to expand it. 5¶

Reaching for another tradition, amicus (but not the principal dissent) turns to the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause. That Clause, amicus observes, permits a judge to ask whether the government has charged a defendant for the same crime a second time. From this, he suggests, it must be that a judge can also look into the defendant’s past conduct to increase his sentence. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 25–26. But that, too, does not follow. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant by prohibiting a judge from even empaneling a jury when the defendant has already faced trial on the charged crime. See, e.g. , Green v. United States , 355 U. S. 184, 188 (1957). The Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ jury trial rights provide a defendant with entirely complementary protections at a different stage of the proceedings by ensuring that, once a jury is lawfully empaneled, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a unanimous jury the facts necessary to sustain the punishment it seeks.¶

Finally, amicus (rejoined now by the principal dissent, see post , at 15–18 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.)) directs us to case law and statutes in four other States—South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Kansas. After the Constitution’s¶

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5 Amicus emphasizes that supplemental-information procedures became more “widely adopted” in the 1920s after Graham . Brief for CourtAppointed Amicus Curiae 16. But, since Apprendi , this Court has insisted on “remain[ing] true” to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment’s original meaning and protecting the rights they secure against “ ‘erosion.’ ” 530 U. S., at 483. Accordingly, relatively modern innovations move us little, for they might just as well represent departures from the Constitution’s historic protections as evidence of them. Ibid .; accord, Gaudin , 515 U. S., at 518–519. Nor, for that matter, does looking to more modern times do much to help amicus . He does not dispute that, even as late as 1965, juries usually still had to find facts about prior convictions, whether under supplemental-information regimes or more traditional ones. See Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 489, n. 15; Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U. S. 224, 261 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).¶

adoption, amicus suggests, each of these States left “a wide range of recidivism-related issues” for judges, rather than juries, to resolve. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 18.¶

But what does this prove? Here again, amicus points to procedures in less than a handful of States. That is not the kind of “uniform postratification practice” that can sometimes “shed light upon the meaning” of the Constitution. Gaudin , 515 U. S., at 519. Nor, again, do these practices prove much even taken on their own terms. Some of these States permitted a judge to make “sequencing” determinations—deciding, for example, whether the present offense was the defendant’s ''second or subsequent'' offense. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 14, and n. 1, 18–19. 6 Some allowed a judge to find whether the defendant had successfully overturned a prior conviction on appeal or secured a pardon. Id ., at 19–20, and n. 4. 7 Some authorized a judge to find whether a defendant’s current offense and past crime occurred within a specified period of time. Id. , at 19. 8 All told, amicus ’s evidence may suggest that in a small number of jurisdictions judges could find the existence, number, and dates of a defendant’s prior convictions. But none of this provides a persuasive basis for revisiting our many precedents prohibiting judges from doing more. Let alone prove ''a longstanding tradition'' in this Nation allowing a judge to find any fact regarding a defendant’s “recidivis[m].” Post , at 5 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).¶

For that matter, it is not clear whether these four States¶

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State v. Hudson , 32 La. Ann. 1052, 1053 (1880).¶

6 See H. Toulmin, Digest of the Laws of the State of Alabama 209 (1823); Ala. Penal Code §73 (1866); 1859 Kan. Sess. Laws pp. 283–284; 1868 Kan. Sess. Laws pp. 380–381; 6 D. McCord, Statutes at Large of South Carolina 413 (1839); State v. Smith , 8 Rich. 460 (SC 1832); U. Phillips, Revised Statutes of Louisiana 155 (1856); 1870 La. Acts p. 206, §4. 7 See 1840 Ala. Sess. Laws 153; 1868 Kan. Sess. Laws pp. 380–381;¶

8 Toulmin, Digest of the Laws of the State of Alabama, at 377.¶

always allowed judges to find even the fact of a defendant’s prior conviction. Take South Carolina. In State v. Smith , 8 Rich. 460 (SC 1832), the court seemed to hold that the government did not have to allege in its indictment that the defendant had been previously convicted “for the crime of horse stealing” because that was a question for “the Court,” id. , at 460–461. But, as another State’s supreme court recognized, in so holding Smith may have gone “too far.” State v. Burgett , 22 Ark. 323, 324 (1860). It is unclear, too, whether Smith even accurately reflected South Carolina’s customary practice. Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 509, n. 5 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Similar problems attend amicus ’s reliance on historic Louisiana practices. In State v. Hudson , 32 La. Ann. 1052 (1880), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a jury did not “ha[ve] to pass” upon the existence of “previous convictions.” Id. , at 1053. But Louisiana “overruled” Hudson three decades later, calling it out of step with “the common law” and “other jurisdictions.” State v. Compagno , 125 La. 669, 671–672, 51 So. 681, 682 (1910). Later still, amicus contends, Louisiana revived Hudson in State v. Guidry , 169 La. 215, 222, 124 So. 832, 835 (1929). See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 14. But however that may be, the historical practices in the four States amicus highlights do not appear to have been nearly as uniform or expansive as he supposes.¶

D¶

Finally, amicus asks us to consider some practical problems. Most especially, he argues that leaving the occasions inquiry to juries would do more to prejudice than protect defendants. Id ., at 41–47. It would because requiring prosecutors to prove that the defendant’s prior crimes took place on distinct occasions would enable them “to regale juries with the details” of the defendant’s past misconduct. Id ., at 42; see also post , at 18–21 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.); post , at 19–23 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).¶

But just as arguments from efficiency cannot alter the demands of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, neither may that practical concern, “of which earlier courts were well aware.” Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 521 (THOMAS, J., concurring). It is hard not to wonder, too: Are we really to suppose that the amici supporting Mr. Erlinger in this Court, including the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National Association of Federal Defenders, have been “somehow duped” into advocating for a rule that would be “unfair to criminal defendants”? Blakely , 542 U. S., at 312; see also NAFD Brief 25; Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 16–17.¶

Of course not. As these groups stress, and the government agrees, traditional tools exist to address the prejudicial effect evidence about a defendant’s past crimes can have on a jury. Most obviously, a court can bifurcate the proceedings. In that “common,” Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 521, n. 10 (THOMAS, J., concurring), and often “fairest” practice, Spencer v. Texas , 385 U. S. 554, 567 (1967), a jury is first tasked with assessing whether the government has proved the elements of the §922(g) felon-in-possession charge. Then, and only if it finds the defendant guilty, the jury turns to consider evidence regarding whether the defendant’s prior offenses occurred on different occasions for purposes of applying ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence under §924(e). JUSTICE JACKSON expresses concern about the “burdens” proceeding this way might impose. See post , at 21. But by sequencing and separating the jury’s determinations, a court decreases the likelihood that a jury will be ''overpersuade[d]'' by the defendant’s prior criminal conduct. Post , at 22 (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (quoting Michelson v. United States , 335 U. S. 469, 476 (1948)).¶

On this, all sides agree. The government reports that it “generally agree[s] to bifurcation” in ACCA cases like this one and that it has not “been able to anticipate as to why¶

[it] wouldn’t agree to bifurcation.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 58–59. Similarly, the National Association of Federal Defenders reports that, “[t]o [its] knowledge, every jury trial but one has been bifurcated when the jury was permitted to decide both the §922(g) unlawful-firearm-possession question and the §924(e) ‘occasions’ question.” NAFD Brief 26. 9 States that “have not already done so can likewise adjust to any state-law implications of [our] straightforward application of Apprendi to . . . ACCA’s different-occasions requirement.” Reply Brief 21; see also Spencer , 385 U. S., at 586 (Warren, C. J., concurring and dissenting) (observing that, whether or not required to do so, at the time most States had adopted “procedures which postpone the introduction of prior convictions until after the jury has found the defendant guilty of the crime currently charged”). 10¶

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10 Once more parting ways with the parties and defense bar amici , JUSTICE JACKSON asserts that Apprendi ’s rule confining judges at sentencing to the facts found by the jury hurts defendants and makes “racial disparities” in our criminal justice system “worse.” Post , at 16–17. As we have seen, however, Apprendi allows judges to lower sentences based on their own factual findings; it only prohibits judges from using their own facts to increase a defendant’s exposure to punishment. See n. 1, supra . As the defense bar amici are quick to point out, that helps defendants. It seems, too, JUSTICE JACKSON has directed her fire at the wrong target. The reports and law review article cited by JUSTICE JACKSON attribute sentencing disparities to this Court’s remedial decision in United States v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 245–246 (2005), as well as various other factors: judges, “prosecutors, law enforcement officials, probation officers . . . , overworked defense attorneys, and other actors involved in maintaining the court system.” K. Klein & S. Klein, A Ra-¶

9 Of the trials where proceedings were bifurcated, the National Association of Federal Defenders observes, some “have resulted in acquittal or dismissal” at the first stage where prejudicial past conduct was omitted; another has resulted in acquittal at the second stage after the jury found the government had not carried its burden of showing the defendant’s prior offenses were committed on separate occasions; three others “have resulted in guilty verdicts” at both stages. NAFD Brief 21–22.¶

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*¶

The jury trial may have “never been efficient.” Apprendi , 530 U. S., at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). It may require assembling a group of the defendant’s peers to resolve unanimously even seemingly straightforward factual questions under a daunting reasonable doubt standard. Avoiding the prejudice associated with the introduction of evidence of past crimes may require careful attention, too. But the right to a jury trial “has always been” an important part of what keeps this Nation “free.” Ibid . Because the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not tolerate the denial of that right in this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.¶

It is so ordered .¶

cially Biased Obstacle Course: Apprendi Transformed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines into a Series of Judicial Obstacles; Can Shame Reduce the Racial Disparities?, 99 N. C. L. Rev. 1391, 1405, 1423 (2021). And, unlike JUSTICE JACKSON, the authors of the very article she cites “celebrate Apprendi ” because, in their view, it “unequivocally” gives a “bargaining chip” to defendants to seek more favorable plea offers. Id ., at 1399, and n. 33; see Blakely , 542 U. S., at 311–313.¶