Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P.

Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.¶verify

The bankruptcy code contains hundreds of interlocking rules about “ `the relations between' ” a “ `debtor and [its] creditors.' ” Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. , 304 U. S. 502, 513–514 (1938). But beneath that complexity lies a simple bargain: A debtor can win a discharge of its debts if it proceeds with honesty and places virtually all its assets on the table for its creditors. The debtor in this case, Purdue Pharma L. P., filed for bankruptcy after facing a wave of litigation for its role in the opioid epidemic. Purdue's longtime owners, members of the Sackler family, confronted a growing number of suits too. But instead of declaring bankruptcy, they chose a different path. From the court overseeing Purdue's bankruptcy, they sought and won an order extinguishing vast numbers of existing and potential claims against them. They obtained all this without securing the consent of those affected or placing anything approaching their total assets on the table for their creditors. The question we face is whether the bankruptcy code authorizes a court to issue an order like that.¶verify

I¶verify

A¶verify

The opioid epidemic represents “one of the largest public health crises in this nation's history.” In re Purdue Pharma L. P. , 69 F. 4th 45, 56 (CA2 2023). Between 1999 and 2019, approximately 247,000 people in the United States died from prescription-opioid overdoses. In re Purdue Pharma L. P. , 635 B. R. 26, 44 (SDNY 2021). The U. S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that the opioid epidemic has cost the country between $53 and $72 billion annually. Ibid.¶verify

Purdue sits at the center of these events. In the mid1990s, it began marketing OxyContin, an opioid prescription pain reliever. 69 F. 4th, at 56. Because of the addictive quality of opioids, doctors had traditionally reserved their use for cancer patients and those “with chronic diseases.”¶verify

635 B. R., at 42. But OxyContin, Purdue claimed, had a novel “time-release” formula that greatly diminished the threat of addiction. Ibid . On that basis, Purdue marketed OxyContin for use in “ `a much broader range' ” of applications, including as a “ `first-line therapy for the treatment of arthritis.' ” Ibid.¶verify

Purdue was a “ `family company,' ” owned and controlled by the Sacklers. Id ., at 40. Members of the Sackler family served as president and chief executive officer; they dominated the board of directors; and they “were heavily involved” in the firm's marketing strategies. 69 F. 4th, at 86 (Wesley, J., concurring in judgment). They “pushed sales targets,” too, and “accompanied sales representatives on `ride along' visits to health care providers” in an effort to maximize OxyContin sales. 635 B. R., at 50.¶verify

Quickly, OxyContin became “ `the most prescribed brandname narcotic medication' ” in the United States. Id. , at 43. Between 1996 and 2019, “Purdue generated approximately $34 billion in revenue . . . , most of which came from OxyContin sales.” Id ., at 39. The company's success propelled the Sacklers onto lists “of the top twenty wealthiest families in America,” with an estimated net worth of $14 billion. Id ., at 40.¶verify

Eventually, however, the firm came under scrutiny. In 2007, a Purdue affiliate pleaded guilty to a federal felony for misbranding OxyContin as “ `less addictive' ” and “ `less subject to abuse . . . than other pain medications.' ” Id ., at 48. Thousands of civil lawsuits followed as individuals, families, and governments within and outside the United States sought damages from Purdue and the Sacklers for injuries allegedly caused by their deceptive marketing practices. 69 F. 4th, at 60.¶verify

Appreciating this litigation “would eventually impact them directly,” id. , at 59, the Sacklers began what one family member described as a “ `milking' program,” 635 B. R., at 57. In the years before the 2007 plea agreement, Purdue's distributions to the Sacklers represented less than 15% of its annual revenue. Ibid . After the plea agreement, the Sacklers began taking as much as 70% of the company's revenue each year. Ibid. Between 2008 and 2016, the family's distributions totaled approximately $11 billion, draining Purdue's total assets by 75% and leaving it in “a significantly weakened financial” state. 69 F. 4th, at 59. The Sacklers diverted much of that money to overseas trusts and familyowned companies. 635 B. R., at 71.¶verify

B¶verify

In 2019, Purdue filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Members of the Sackler family saw in that development an opportunity “to get [their own] goals accomplished.” In re Purdue Pharma L. P. , No. 19–23649 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY, Aug. 18, 2021), ECF Doc. 3599, p. 35 (testimony of David Sackler). They proposed to return to Purdue's bankruptcy estate $4.325 billion of the $11 billion they had withdrawn from the company in recent years. 69 F. 4th, at 61. But they offered to do so only through payments spread out over a decade. Id ., at 60. And, in return, they sought the estate's agreement on, and a judicial order addressing, two matters. First, the Sacklers wanted to extinguish any claims the estate might have against family members, including for fraudulently transferring funds from Purdue in the years preceding its bankruptcy. In re Purdue Pharma L. P. , 633 B. R. 53, 83–84 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY 2021). Second, the Sacklers wanted to end the growing number of lawsuits against them brought by opioid victims (the Sackler discharge). Ibid.¶verify

The Sackler discharge they proposed comprised a release and an injunction. The release sought to void not just current opioid-related claims against the family, but future ones as well. It sought to ban not just claims by creditors participating in the bankruptcy proceeding, but claims by anyone who might otherwise sue Purdue. It sought to extinguish not only claims for negligence, but also claims for fraud and willful misconduct. 1 App. 193. And it proposed to end all these lawsuits without the consent of the opioid victims who brought them. To enforce this release, the Sacklers sought an injunction “forever stay[ing], restrain[ing,] and enjoin[ing]” claims against them. Id. , at 279. That injunction would not just prevent suits against the company's officers and directors but would run in favor of hundreds, if not thousands, of Sackler family members and entities under their control. Id ., at 117–190.¶verify

Purdue agreed to these terms and included them in the reorganization plan it presented to the bankruptcy court for approval. In that plan, Purdue further proposed to reorganize as a “public benefit” company dedicated primarily to opioid education and abatement efforts. 633 B. R., at 74. As for individual victims harmed by the company's products, Purdue offered, with help from the Sacklers' anticipated contribution, to provide payments from a base amount of $3,500 up to a ceiling of $48,000 (for the most dire cases, and all before deductions for attorney's fees and other expenses). See 1 App. 557–559, 573–585; 6 App. in No. 22–110 etc. (CA2), p. 1697. For those receiving more than the base amount, payments would come in installments spread over as many as 10 years. 7 id. , at 1805, 1812.¶verify

Creditors were polled on the proposed plan. Though most who returned ballots supported it, fewer than 20% of eligible creditors participated. 21 id. , at 6253, 6258. Thousands of opioid victims voted against the plan too, and many pleaded with the bankruptcy court not to wipe out their claims against the Sacklers without their consent. 635 B. R., at 35. “Our system of justice,” they wrote, “demands that the allegations against the Sackler family be fully and fairly litigated in a public and open trial, that they be judged by an impartial jury, and that they be held accountable to those they have harmed.” In re Purdue Pharma L. P. , No. 7:21cv–07532 (SDNY, Oct. 25, 2021), ECF Doc. 94, p. 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). The U. S. Trustee, charged with promoting the integrity of the bankruptcy system for all stakeholders, joined in these objections. So did eight States, the District of Columbia, the city of Seattle, and various Canadian municipalities and Tribes, each of which sought to pursue its own claims against the Sacklers. 635 B. R., at 35 .¶verify

C¶verify

The bankruptcy court rejected the objectors' arguments and entered an order confirming the plan, including its provisions related to the Sackler discharge. 633 B. R., at 95–115. Soon, however, the district court vacated that decision. Nothing in the law, that court held, authorized the bankruptcy court to extinguish claims against the Sacklers without the consent of the opioid victims who brought them. 635 B. R., at 115.¶verify

After that setback, plan proponents, including Purdue, members of the Sackler family, and various creditors, appealed to the Second Circuit. While their appeal was pending, they also floated a new proposal. Now, they said, the Sacklers were willing to contribute an additional $1.175 to $1.675 billion to Purdue's estate if the eight objecting States and the District of Columbia would withdraw their objections to the firm's reorganization plan. 69 F. 4th, at 67. The Sacklers' proposed contribution still fell well short of the $11 billion they received from the company between 2008 and 2016. Nor did it begin to reflect the earnings the Sacklers have enjoyed from that sum over time. And the proposed contribution would still come in installments spread over many years. But the new proposal was enough to persuade the States and the District of Columbia to drop their objections to the plan, even as a number of individual victims, the Canadian creditors, and the U. S. Trustee persisted in theirs.¶verify

Ultimately, a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed the district court and revived the bankruptcy court's order approving the estate's (now-modified) reorganization plan. Writing separately, Judge Wesley acknowledged that a bankruptcy court enjoys broad authority to modify debtorcreditor relations. But, he argued, nothing in the bankruptcy code grants a bankruptcy court the “extraordinary” power to release and enjoin claims against a third party without the consent of the affected claimants. Id ., at 89 (opinion concurring in judgment). The majority's contrary view, he added, “pin[ned the Second] Circuit firmly on one side of a weighty issue that, for too long, has split the courts of appeals.” Id ., at 90.¶verify

After the Second Circuit ruled, the U. S. Trustee filed an application with this Court to stay its decision. We granted the application and, treating it as a petition for a writ of certiorari, agreed to take this case to resolve the circuit split Judge Wesley highlighted. 600 U. S. --- (2023). 1¶verify

II¶verify

The plan proponents and U. S. Trustee agree on certain foundational points. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it “creates an estate” that includes virtually all the debtor's assets. 11 U. S. C. § 541(a). Under Chapter 11, the debtor can work with its creditors to develop a reorganization plan governing the distribution of the estate's assets; it must then present that plan to the bankruptcy court and win its approval. §§ 1121, 1123, 1129, 1141. Once the bankruptcy court issues an order confirming the plan, that document binds the debtor and its creditors going forward—even those who did not assent to the plan. § 1141(a).¶verify

Most relevant here, a bankruptcy court's order confirming a plan “discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation,” except as provided in the plan, the confirmation order, or the code. § 1141(d)(1)(A).¶verify

1 For examples of decisions on both sides of the split, compare In re Pacific Lumber Co. , 584 F. 3d 229 (CA5 2009); In re Lowenschuss , 67 F. 3d 1394 (CA9 1995); In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc. , 922 F. 2d 592 (CA10 1990), with In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC , 945 F. 3d 126 (CA3 2019); In re Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. , 780 F. 3d 1070 (CA11 2015); In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. , 519 F. 3d 640 (CA7 2008); In re Dow Corning Corp. , 280 F. 3d 648 (CA6 2002); In re A. H. Robins Co. , 880 F. 2d 694 (CA4 1989).¶verify

That discharge not only releases or “void[s] any past or future judgments on the” discharged debt; it also “operat[es] as an injunction . . . prohibit[ing] creditors from attempting to collect or to recover the debt.” Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood , 541 U. S. 440, 447 (2004) (citing §§ 524(a)(1), (2)). Generally, however, a discharge operates only for the benefit of the debtor against its creditors and “does not affect the liability of any other entity.” § 524(e).¶verify

The Sacklers have not filed for bankruptcy and have not placed virtually all their assets on the table for distribution to creditors, yet they seek what essentially amounts to a discharge. They hope to win a judicial order releasing pending claims against them brought by opioid victims. They seek an injunction “permanently and forever” foreclosing similar suits in the future. 1 App. 279. And they seek all this without the consent of those affected. The question we face thus boils down to whether a court in bankruptcy may effectively extend to nondebtors the benefits of a Chapter 11 discharge usually reserved for debtors .¶verify

A¶verify

For an answer, we turn to § 1123. It addresses the “[c]ontents”—or terms—of the bankruptcy reorganization plan a debtor presents and a court approves in Chapter 11 proceedings. Some plan terms are mandatory, § 1123(a); others are optional, § 1123(b). No one suggests that anything like the Sackler discharge must be included in a debtor's reorganization plan. Instead, plan proponents contend, it is a provision a debtor may include and a court may approve in a reorganization plan.¶verify

Section 1123(b) governs that question. It directs that a plan “may”:¶verify

“(1) impair or leave unimpaired any class of claims, secured or unsecured, or of interests;¶verify

“(2) . . . provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor not previously rejected under [§ 365];¶verify

“(3) provide for—¶verify

“(A) the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate; or¶verify

“(B) the retention and enforcement by the debtor, by the trustee, or by a representative of the estate appointed for such purpose, of any such claim or interest;¶verify

“(4) provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale among holders of claims or interests;¶verify

“(5) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims; and¶verify

“(6) include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”¶verify

We can easily rule out the first five of these paragraphs as potential sources of legal authority for the Sackler discharge. They permit a plan to address claims and property belonging to a debtor or its estate. §§ 1123(b)(2), (3), (4). They permit a plan to modify the rights of creditors who hold claims against the debtor or its estate. §§ 1123(b)(1), (5). But nothing in those paragraphs authorizes a plan to extinguish claims against third parties, like the Sacklers, without the consent of the affected claimants, like the opioid victims. If authority for the Sackler discharge can be found anywhere, it must be found in paragraph (6). That is the paragraph on which the Second Circuit primarily rested its decision below, and it is the one on which plan proponents pin their case here. 2¶verify

2 The Sacklers suggest that, if 11 U. S. C. § 1123(b) does not permit a bankruptcy court to release and enjoin claims against a nondebtor without the affected claimants' consent, § 105(a) does. See Brief for MortimerSide Initial Covered Respondents 19 (Brief for Sackler Family). That provision allows a bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judg-¶verify

As the plan proponents see it, paragraph (6) allows a debtor to include in its plan, and a court to order, any term not “expressly forbid[den]” by the bankruptcy code as long as a bankruptcy judge deems it “appropriate” and consistent with the broad “purpose[s]” of bankruptcy. 69 F. 4th, at 7374; post , at 267–268 ( Kavanaugh , J ., dissenting). And because the code does not expressly forbid a nonconsensual nondebtor discharge, the reasoning goes, the bankruptcy court was free to authorize one here after finding it an “appropriate” provision. See Brief for Sackler Family 19–21; Brief for Purdue 20; post , at 240–242.¶verify

This understanding of the statute faces an immediate obstacle. Paragraph (6) is a catchall phrase tacked on at the end of a long and detailed list of specific directions. When faced with a catchall phrase like that, courts do not necessarily afford it the broadest possible construction it can bear. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U. S. 497, 512 (2018). Instead, we generally appreciate that the catchall must be interpreted in light of its surrounding context and read to “embrace only objects similar in nature” to the specific examples preceding it. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). So, for example, when a statute sets out a list discussing “cars, trucks, motorcycles, or any other vehicles,” we appreciate that the catchall phrase may reach similar landbound vehicles (perhaps including buses and camper vans), but it does not reach dissimilar “vehicles” (such as airplanes and submarines). See McBoyle v. United States , 283 U. S. 25, 26¶verify

ment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the bankruptcy code. § 105(a). As the Second Circuit recognized, however, “§ 105(a) alone cannot justify” the imposition of nonconsensual third-party releases because it serves only to “ `carry out' ” authorities expressly conferred elsewhere in the code. 69 F. 4th 45, 73 (2023) (quoting § 105(a)); see also 2 R. Levin & H. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶105.01[1], p. 105–6 (16th ed. 2023). Purdue concedes this point, Brief for Debtor Respondents 19, n. 5 (Brief for Purdue), as do several other plan proponents, see, e. g. , Brief for Respondent Ad Hoc Committee 29. Necessarily, then, our focus trains on § 1123(b)(6).¶verify

27 (1931). This ancient interpretive principle, sometimes called the ejusdem generis canon, seeks to afford a statute the scope a reasonable reader would attribute to it.¶verify

Viewed with that much in mind, we do not think paragraph (6) affords a bankruptcy court the authority the plan proponents suppose. In some circumstances, it may be difficult to discern what a statute's specific listed items share in common. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 207–208 (2012). But here an obvious link exists: When Congress authorized “appropriate” plan provisions in paragraph (6), it did so only after enumerating five specific sorts of provisions, all of which concern the debtor —its rights and responsibilities, and its relationship with its creditors. Doubtless, paragraph (6) operates to confer additional authorities on a bankruptcy court. See United States v. Energy Resources Co. , 495 U. S. 545, 549 (1990). But the catchall cannot be fairly read to endow a bankruptcy court with the “radically different” power to discharge the debts of a nondebtor without the consent of affected nondebtor claimants. Epic Systems Corp. , 584 U. S., at 513; see also RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 566 U. S. 639, 645–647 (2012).¶verify

The catchall's text underscores the point. Congress could have said in paragraph (6) that “everything not expressly prohibited is permitted.” But it didn't. Instead, Congress set out a detailed list of powers, followed by a catchall that it qualified with the term “appropriate.” That quintessentially “context dependent” term often draws its meaning from surrounding provisions. Sossamon v. Texas , 563 U. S. 277, 286 (2011). And we know to look to the statute's preceding specific paragraphs as the relevant “context” here because paragraph (6) tells us so. It permits “any other appropriate provision”—that is, “other” than the provisions already discussed in paragraphs (1) through (5). (Emphasis added.) Each of those “other” paragraphs authorizes a bankruptcy court to adjust claims without consent only to the extent such claims concern the debtor. From this, it follows naturally that an “appropriate provision” adopted pursuant to the catchall that purports to extinguish claims without consent should be similarly constrained. See, e. g. , Epic Systems Corp. , 584 U. S., at 512–513.¶verify

For its part, the dissent does not dispute that the ejusdem generis canon applies to § 1123(b)(6). Post , at 259–261; see also Brief for Sackler Family 44; Brief for Purdue 23. But it disagrees with our application of the canon for two reasons. First, the dissent claims, it “is factually incorrect” to suggest that all the provisions of § 1123(b) concern the debtor's rights and responsibilities. Post , at 260. The dissent points out that a bankruptcy estate may settle creditors' “derivative claims” against nondebtors under paragraph (3). Post , at 261 . And this “indisputable point,” the dissent declares, “defeats the Court's conclusion that § 1123(b)'s provisions relate only to the debtor and do not allow releases of claims that victims and creditors hold against non-debtors.” Post , at 262; see Brief for Purdue 24–25.¶verify

But that argument contains a glaring flaw. The dissent neglects why a bankruptcy court may resolve derivative claims under paragraph (3): It may because those claims belong to the debtor's estate. See, e . g ., In re Ontos, Inc. , 478 F. 3d 427, 433 (CA1 2007). In a derivative action, the named plaintiff “is only a nominal plaintiff. The substantive claim belongs to the corporation.” 2 J. Macey, Corporation Laws § 13.20[D], p. 13–140 (2020–4 Supp.). And no one questions that Purdue may address in its own bankruptcy plan claims “wherever located and by whomever held,” § 541(a)—including those claims derivatively asserted by another on its behalf, see § 1123(b)(3). The problem is, the Sackler discharge is nothing like that. Rather than seek to resolve claims that substantively belong to Purdue, it seeks to extinguish claims against the Sacklers that belong to their victims. And precisely nothing in § 1123(b) suggests those claims can be bargained away without the consent of those affected, as if the claims were somehow Purdue's own property. 3¶verify

Having come up short on the text of § 1123(b), the dissent pivots to the statute's purpose. Post , at 260. As the dissent sees it, our application of the ejusdem generis canon should focus less on the provisions preceding the catchall and more on the overall “purpose of bankruptcy law” in solving “collective-action problem[s].” Post , at 231, 261–262; see also Brief for Purdue 21. But there is an obvious difficulty with this approach, too. As this Court has long recognized, “[n]o statute pursues a single policy at all costs.” Bartenwerfer v. Buckley , 598 U. S. 69, 81 (2023). Always, the question we face is how far Congress has gone in pursuing one policy or another. See ibid. So, yes, bankruptcy law may serve to address some collective-action problems, but no one (save perhaps the dissent) thinks it provides a bankruptcy court with a roving commission to resolve all such problems that happen its way, blind to the role other mechanisms (legislation, class actions, multi-district litigation, consensual settlements, among others) play in addressing them. And here, the five paragraphs that precede the catchall tell us that bankruptcy courts may have many powers, including the power to address certain collective-action problems when they implicate the debtor's rights and responsibilities. But those directions also indicate that a bankruptcy court's powers are not limitless and do not endow it with the power to extinguish without their consent claims held by nondebtors¶verify

3 In an effort to blur this distinction, the dissent points out that the Sackler discharge covers claims for which Purdue's conduct is a “legally relevant factor.” Post , at 259–260 (quoting 69 F. 4th, at 80). But that does not alter the fact that the Sackler discharge would extinguish the victim s' claims against the Sacklers . Those claims neither belong to Purdue nor are they asserted against Purdue or its estate. The dissent disregards these elemental distinctions. See, e . g ., post , at 273 (conflating the estate's power to settle its own fraudulent transfer claims against the Sacklers with the power to extinguish those of the victims against the Sacklers).¶verify

(here, the opioid victims) against other nondebtors (here, the Sacklers). 4¶verify

B¶verify

When resolving a dispute about a statute's meaning, we sometimes look for guidance not just in its immediate terms but in related provisions as well. See, e . g ., Turkiye Halk Bankasi A. S. v. United States , 598 U. S. 264, 275 (2023). Paragraph (6) itself alludes to this fact by instructing that any plan term adopted under its auspices must not be “inconsistent with the applicable provisions of” the bankruptcy code. Following that direction and looking to Chapter 11 more broadly, we find at least three further reasons why § 1123(b)(6) cannot bear the interpretation the plan proponents and the dissent would have us give it.¶verify

First, consider what is and who can earn a discharge. As we have seen, a discharge releases the debtor from its debts and enjoins future efforts to collect them—even by those who do not assent to the debtor's reorganization plan. §§ 524(a)(1)–(2), 1129(b)(1), 1141(a). Generally, too, the bankruptcy code reserves this benefit to “the debtor”—the entity that files for bankruptcy. § 1141(d)(1)(A); accord, § 524(e); see also §§ 727(a)–(b). The plan proponents and the dissent's reading of § 1123(b)(6) would defy these rules by effectively affording to a nondebtor a discharge usually reserved for the debtor alone.¶verify

Second, notice how the code constrains the debtor. To win a discharge, again as we have seen, the code generally requires the debtor to come forward with virtually all its assets. §§ 541(a)(1), 548. Nor is the discharge a debtor receives unbounded. It does not reach claims based on¶verify

4 The dissent characterizes our analysis of paragraph (6) as “breez[y],” as if the analysis would be correct if only it were belabored. Post , at 259. And yet it is the dissent that relegates the text of the relevant statute, § 1123(b), to a pair of footnotes bookending a 25-page exposition on collective-action problems and public policy, one that precedes any effort to engage with our statutory analysis. See post , at 232, n. 1, 257, n. 5.¶verify

“fraud” or those alleging “willful and malicious injury.” §§ 523(a)(2), (4), (6). And it cannot “affect any right to trial by jury” a creditor may have “with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.” 28 U. S. C. § 1411(a). The plan proponents and the dissent's reading of § 1123(b)(6) transgresses all these limits too. The Sacklers have not agreed to place anything approaching their full assets on the table for opioid victims. Yet they seek a judicial order that would extinguish virtually all claims against them for fraud, willful injury, and even wrongful death, all without the consent of those who have brought and seek to bring such claims. In each of these ways, the Sacklers seek to pay less than the code ordinarily requires and receive more than it normally permits.¶verify

Finally, there is a notable exception to the code's general rules. For asbestos-related bankruptcies—and only for such bankruptcies—Congress has provided that, “[n]otwithstanding” the usual rule that a debtor's discharge does not affect the liabilities of others on that same debt, § 524(e), courts may issue “an injunction . . . bar[ring] any action directed against a third party” under certain statutorily specified circumstances. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii). That the code does authorize courts to enjoin claims against third parties without their consent, but does so in only one context, makes it all the more unlikely that § 1123(b)(6) is best read to afford courts that same authority in every context. See, e . g ., Bittner v. United States , 598 U. S. 85, 94 (2023); AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC , 593 U. S. 67, 77 (2021). 5¶verify

5 The dissent claims that, in making this observation, we defy § 524(g)'s directive that “[n]othing in [it], or in the amendments made by [its addition to the bankruptcy code], shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede any other authority the court has to issue injunctions in connection with an order confirming a plan of reorganization.” 108 Stat. 4117, note following 11 U. S. C. § 524; see post , at 269–270. That charge misunderstands the point. We do not read § 524(g) to “impair” or “modify” authority previously available to courts in bankruptcy. To the contrary, we simply understand § 524(g) to illustrate how Congress might proceed if it intended¶verify

How do the plan proponents and the dissent reply to all this? Essentially, they ask us to look the other way. Whatever limits the code imposes on debtors and discharges mean nothing, they say, because the Sacklers seek a “release,” not a “discharge.” See, e. g. , post , at 271–273. But word games cannot obscure the underlying reality. Once more, the Sacklers seek greater relief than a bankruptcy discharge normally affords, for they hope to extinguish even claims for wrongful death and fraud, and they seek to do so without putting anything close to all their assets on the table. Nor is what the Sacklers seek a traditional release, for they hope to have a court extinguish claims of opioid victims without their consent. See, e. g. , J . Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken 152 (2008) (“settlements are, by definition, consensual”); accord, Firefighters v. Cleveland , 478 U. S. 501, 529 (1986). Describe the relief the Sacklers seek how you will, nothing in the bankruptcy code contemplates (much less authorizes) it.¶verify

C¶verify

If text and context supply two strikes against the plan proponents and the dissent's construction of § 1123(b)(6), history offers a third. When Congress enacted the present bankruptcy code in 1978, it did “not write `on a clean slate.' ” Hall v. United States , 566 U. S. 506, 523 (2012) (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm , 502 U. S. 410, 419 (1992)). Recognizing as much, this Court has said that pre-code practice may sometimes inform our interpretation of the code's more “ambiguous” provisions. RadLAX Gateway Hotel , 566 U. S., at 649.¶verify

While we discern no ambiguity in § 1123(b)(6) for the reasons explored above, historical practice confirms the lesson we take from it. Every bankruptcy law the parties and their amici have pointed us to, from 1800 until 1978, gener-¶verify

to confer upon bankruptcy courts a novel and extraordinary power to extinguish claims against third parties without claimants' consent. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. , 580 U. S. 451, 465 (2017).¶verify

ally reserved the benefits of discharge to the debtor who offered a “fair and full surrender of [its] property.” Sturges v. Crowninshield , 4 Wheat. 122, 176 (1819); accord, Central Va. Community College v. Katz , 546 U. S. 356, 363–364 (2006); see, e . g ., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 5, 2 Stat. 23 (repealed 1803); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, § 3, 5 Stat. 442–443 (repealed 1843); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, §§ 11, 29, 14 Stat. 521, 531532 (repealed 1878); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 7, 14, 30 Stat. 548, 550 (repealed 1978). No one has directed us to a statute or case suggesting American courts in the past enjoyed the power in bankruptcy to discharge claims brought by nondebtors against other nondebtors, all without the consent of those affected. Surely, if Congress had meant to reshape traditional practice so profoundly in the present bankruptcy code, extending to courts the capacious new power the plan proponents claim, one might have expected it to say so expressly “somewhere in the [c]ode itself.” Dewsnup , 502 U. S., at 420. 6 III¶verify

Faced with so many marks against its interpretation of the law, plan proponents and the dissent resort to a policy argument. The Sacklers, they remind us, have signaled that they will not return any funds to Purdue's estate unless the bankruptcy court grants them the sweeping nonconsensual release and injunction they seek. Absent these concessions, plan proponents and the dissent emphatically predict, “there will be no viable path” for victims to recover even $3,500¶verify

6 The dissent declares pre-code practice irrelevant to the task at hand and insists the power to order nonconsensual releases has been settled by “decades” of bankruptcy court practice. Post , at 229, 231, 234, 236, 274275. But in resisting the notion that pre-code practice may inform our work, the dissent defies our precedents. And in appealing to “decades” of lower court practice, the dissent seems to forget why we took this case in the first place: to resolve a longstanding and deeply entrenched disagreement between lower courts over the legality of nonconsensual thirdparty releases. See n. 1, supra .¶verify

each. Tr. of Oral Arg. 100–101; Brief for Sackler Family 27; see Brief for Respondent Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L. P. et al. 45–46; post , at 230, 246–253, 276–278.¶verify

The U. S. Trustee disputes that assessment. Yes, he says, reversing the Second Circuit may cause Purdue's current reorganization plan to unravel. But that would also mean the Sacklers would face lawsuits by individual victims, States, other governmental entities, and perhaps even fraudulenttransfer claims from the bankruptcy estate. So much legal exposure, the Trustee asserts, may induce the Sacklers to negotiate consensual releases on terms more favorable to opioid victims. Brief for Petitioner 47–48. The Sacklers may “want global peace,” the Trustee acknowledges, but that doesn't “mea[n] that they wouldn't pay a lot for 97.5 percent peace.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. After all, the Trustee reminds us, during the appeal in this very case, the Sacklers agreed to increase their contribution by more than $1 billion in order to secure the consent of the eight objecting States. If past is prologue, the Trustee says, there may be a better deal on the horizon. 7¶verify

Even putting that aside, the Trustee urges us to consider the ramifications of this case for others. Nonconsensual third-party releases, he observes, allow tortfeasors to win immunity from the claims of their victims, including for claims (like wrongful death and fraud) they could not dis-¶verify

7 The parties likewise spar over whether, absent the Sacklers' discharge, the family could deplete the estate by asserting indemnification claims against the company. Plan proponents and the dissent point to a 2004 agreement that commits Purdue to cover certain liability and legal expenses the Sacklers incur. Brief for Purdue 10; post , at 247–250. But here again, the Trustee sees things differently. He underscores the plan proponents' concession that the 2004 agreement “does not apply if a court determines the Sacklers `did not act in good faith.' ” Reply Brief 16. And, he adds, bankruptcy courts have a variety of statutory tools at their disposal to disallow or equitably subordinate any potential indemnification claims the Sacklers might pursue. Ibid. (citing §§ 502(e)(1)(B), 510(c)(1)).¶verify

charge in bankruptcy, and do so without placing anything approaching all of their assets on the table. Endorsing that maneuver, the Trustee says, would provide a “roadmap for corporations and wealthy individuals to misuse the bankruptcy system” in future cases “to avoid mass-tort liability.” Brief for Petitioner 44–45.¶verify

Both sides of this policy debate may have their points. But, in the end, we are the wrong audience for them. As the people's elected representatives, Members of Congress enjoy the power, consistent with the Constitution, to make policy judgments about the proper scope of a bankruptcy discharge. Someday, Congress may choose to add to the bankruptcy code special rules for opioid-related bankruptcies as it has for asbestos-related cases. Or it may choose not to do so. Either way, if a policy decision like that is to be made, it is for Congress to make. Despite the misimpression left by today's dissent, our only proper task is to interpret and apply the law as we find it; and nothing in present law authorizes the Sackler discharge.¶verify

IV¶verify

As important as the question we decide today are ones we do not. Nothing in what we have said should be construed to call into question consensual third-party releases offered in connection with a bankruptcy reorganization plan; those sorts of releases pose different questions and may rest on different legal grounds than the nonconsensual release at issue here. See, e. g. , In re Specialty Equipment Cos. , 3 F. 3d 1043, 1047 (CA7 1993). Nor do we have occasion today to express a view on what qualifies as a consensual release or pass upon a plan that provides for the full satisfaction of claims against a third-party nondebtor. Additionally, because this case involves only a stayed reorganization plan, we do not address whether our reading of the bankruptcy code would justify unwinding reorganization plans that have already become effective and been substantially consummated. Confining ourselves to the question presented, we hold only that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seeks to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants. Because the Second Circuit ruled otherwise, its judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.¶verify

It is so ordered.¶verify