EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C.

JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.¶

Though I would reach a different judgment, the Court and I travel much of the way together. This case involves six small refineries. Each petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency for a hardship exemption from the Clean Air Act’s renewable fuel mandates. The agency denied all six refineries’ petitions. The question we face does not concern the merits of what EPA did, only where the small refineries’ lawsuit challenging the agency’s actions should be heard. The Act instructs that litigation over “nationally applicable” EPA “actions” belongs in the D. C. Circuit, while disputes over “locally or regionally applicable” agency “actions” generally belong in a regional circuit. 42 U. S. C. §7607(b)(1). In Parts I and II of its opinion, the Court concludes that these rules presumptively route the dispute before us to a regional circuit because EPA’s decision to deny an individual refinery’s petition for a hardship exemption is a “locally or regionally applicable” action. With all that, I agree.¶

But then, in Part III of its opinion, the Court pivots. Even when a case challenges only a “locally or regionally applicable” action, the Court observes, the Act routes it to the D. C.¶

Circuit if EPA’s action “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” Applying a new multistep test it announces, the Court concludes that EPA’s actions at issue here were based on such a determination. As a result, the Court holds, the right venue for this case turns out to be the D. C. Circuit after all.¶

In my view, that pivot is a mistake. The Clean Air Act’s venue provision works in harmony with its substantive provisions. Throughout, those substantive provisions direct EPA to make certain “determinations” before it may take certain “actions.” When it comes to acting on a small refinery’s hardship petition, nothing in the Act’s substantive provisions calls on EPA to make a “determination of nationwide scope or effect.” Instead, the Act requires the agency to evaluate only whether a particular small refinery seeking an exemption would suffer a hardship without one. Accordingly, the Act’s venue provision routes this dispute to a regional circuit, just as the Fifth Circuit recognized below. The Court’s new and reticulated test for assessing venue disputes under the Act strikes me as both mistaken and likely to render simple venue questions unnecessarily difficult and expensive to resolve.¶

I¶

Start with how I would analyze this case. The Clean Air Act’s venue provision, found in 42 U. S. C. §7607(b)(1), supplies three basic rules. First, challenges to “nationally applicable” agency “action[s]” must be brought in the D. C. Circuit. Second, challenges to “locally or regionally” applicable agency “action[s]” must be filed in the appropriate regional circuit. Third, as an exception to the second rule, challenges to locally or regionally applicable agency actions belong in the D. C. Circuit if they are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” 1 The central question this case poses concerns the relationship between the second and third rules: When is a locally or regionally applicable “action” under the Clean Air Act “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”?¶

As I see it, the Act itself supplies the answer. Working in concert with the Act’s venue provision, the Act’s substantive provisions tell us what kinds of “actions” the agency is lawfully authorized to take and when those actions may be based on “determinations of nationwide scope or effect.” Here, the relevant substantive provisions permit EPA to take a specific “action”—namely, the granting or denying of a small refinery’s hardship petition. But, by their terms, those provisions do not call for a nationwide “determination” when the agency acts. Instead, the only decisions EPA must make are refinery-specific ones. Accordingly, the dispute before us belongs in an appropriate regional circuit.¶

A¶

To appreciate how the Act’s substantive and venue provisions interact, begin with a look at the substantive provisions addressing the renewable fuel standards that lie at the heart of this case.¶

As a rule, §7545( o )(2) requires the Nation’s fuel supply to include ethanol or other renewable fuels in fixed amounts that increase over time. See HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn. , 594 U. S. 382, 385–386 (2021). But the Act also permits EPA to take various actions inconsistent with that general rule if it makes certain determinations. So, for example, §7545( o )(7)(A)(i) allows EPA to waive some renewable fuel mandates “based on a¶

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1 To implicate this exception, EPA must also certify its belief that its action “is based on . . . a determination” of nationwide scope or effect. §7607(b)(1). But that requirement is irrelevant in this case because all agree that EPA satisfied it, so I will not address it further. Ante , at 13.¶

determination” that enforcing them “would severely harm the economy or environment of a State, a region, or the United States.” Similarly, EPA may waive renewable fuel requirements “based on a determination . . . that there is an inadequate domestic [fuel] supply.” §7545( o )(7)(A)(ii). Similarly again, §§7545(b)(4)(C)(ii) and (iii) permit EPA to waive other standards if it “determines that . . . extreme and unusual . . . circumstances exist in a State or region.” Beyond those examples, §7545 discusses various other actions the agency may take after making various other determinations. (In all, §7545 uses the word “determination” or one of its cognates more than 70 times.)¶

Now apply these observations about §7545’s substantive provisions to the Act’s venue provision. If, for example, EPA waives a renewable fuel standard for a single State under §7545( o )(7)(A)(i) “based on a determination” that “implement[ing]” those standards “would severely harm the economy . . . of a State,” §7607(b)(1) would route disputes over that action to the appropriate regional circuit. After all, a determination about the economy of a particular State is hardly one of “nationwide scope or effect.” §7607(b)(1). On the other hand, if EPA issues such a waiver based on a “determination” that implementing the renewable fuel standard in question “would severely harm the economy [of] the United States,” §7607(b)(1) would channel any litigation over that action to the D. C. Circuit.¶

The substantive provisions at issue in today’s companion case illustrate the same point. That litigation revolves around federal air quality standards and the State Implementation Plans (SIPs) States must prepare to meet them. See Oklahoma v. EPA , 605 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025) (slip op., at 2–3). Section 7410 sets forth the general rules about what SIPs must contain and how EPA must go about assessing them. But that section also authorizes EPA to take certain actions inconsistent with those rules after making certain determinations. (For its part, §7410 uses “determination” or one of its cognates more than 20 times.) So, for example, §7410(b) permits EPA to “extend the period for [the] submission of any” SIP for up to 18 months “wherever [the EPA Administrator] determines necessary.” And §7410(g) allows EPA to “disapprov[e]” a Governor’s decision to suspend a SIP component if the agency “determines” that his decision “does not meet” certain statutory criteria (including whether the suspension is necessary “to prevent substantial increases in unemployment”).¶

Now consider where the Act’s venue provision sends disputes about EPA actions under these substantive provisions. Suppose EPA determines that it is “necessary” to extend the submission deadline for SIPs across the country, and the agency acts accordingly pursuant to §7410(b). In those circumstances, an argument might be made that §7607(b)(1) routes disputes about that action to the D. C. Circuit. Cf. Kentucky v. EPA , 123 F. 4th 447, 466 (CA6 2024). But if EPA acts pursuant to §7410(g) to countermand a Governor’s decision to suspend a SIP component based on a determination that his decision defies the Act’s terms, §7607(b)(1) would likely send any dispute over that action to a regional circuit.¶

B¶

With that much in hand, return to the question whether the Act’s venue provision directs this lawsuit to a regional circuit or the D. C. Circuit.¶

As we have seen, §7545 lays out the Act’s substantive renewable fuel standards and generally requires refineries to mix a certain (and regularly increasing) amount of renewable fuels into the transportation fuel they produce. See Part I–A, supra ; HollyFrontier , 594 U. S., at 385–386. But §7545 also allows EPA to exempt small refineries from these mandates “for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” §7545( o )(9)(B)(i). Seeking to take advantage of this provision, the six small refineries before us individually petitioned EPA for hardship exemptions. See 86 F. 4th 1121, 1129–1130 (CA5 2023). In the end, the agency denied each refinery’s request. App. to Pet. for Cert. 251a–252a; id ., at 305a–310a. Now, the small refineries seek to challenge EPA’s actions in court. That challenge belongs in a regional circuit because nothing in the Act’s relevant substantive provisions calls for EPA to act on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.¶

Just walk through the substantive provisions addressing small refineries one by one. To account for the fact that small refineries may have more difficulty meeting evolving renewable fuel mandates than their larger rivals, Congress in 2005 granted them a blanket exemption until 2011. See §7545( o )(9)(A); HollyFrontier , 594 U. S., at 386–387. After that, Congress directed EPA to extend a small refinery’s exemption “for a period of not less than 2 additional years” if the “Secretary of Energy determines” that the refinery in question “would be subject to a disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply” with the Act’s renewable fuel mandates. §7545( o )(9)(A)(ii)(II). Even beyond that, Congress permitted a small refinery to petition “at any time” for “an extension” of its “exemption . . . for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” §7545( o )(9)(B)(i). When it comes to deciding whether to grant or deny such a petition, the Act directs EPA to “consul[t] with the Secretary of Energy,” consider his “determin[ation]” whether “a” particular “small refinery” would suffer “disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply,” and consider “other economic factors.” §§7545( o )(9)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). Nowhere does the Act call for a determination of nationwide scope or effect. To the contrary, after the blanket exemption for small refineries expired in 2011, all agency actions and determinations became refinery-specific ones.¶

Any doubt on that score is resolved by comparing these substantive provisions with others we have encountered.¶

Section 7545( o )(7)(A), remember, allows EPA to waive certain renewable fuel standards “based on a determination . . . that implementation of the requirement would severely harm the economy or environment of . . . the United States,” or “based on a determination . . . that there is an inadequate domestic [fuel] supply.” As that provision illustrates, when it wished to do so, Congress knew how to say that EPA may take a certain action based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. That we have nothing like that here is a telling sign that the small-refinery provisions work differently and do not task EPA with taking any nationally applicable action or making any determination of nationwide scope or effect. See Feliciano v. Department of Transportation , 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 6).¶

EPA’s own statements convey the same message. The agency represents that it ''consider[s] each petition on the merits'' and examines ''individual refinery information'' when passing on individual hardship petitions. 86 F. 4th, at 1133. EPA represents, too, that it “determined that none of the petitioning small refineries” merited a hardship exemption only after completing “a thorough evaluation of the data and information provided” by each small refinery. Brief for Petitioner 10; App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a–95a.¶

To be sure, EPA also highlights two features of its administrative proceedings that, it says, prove the agency took a “nationally applicable action,” or at least made a “determination of nationwide scope or effect.” For one, EPA emphasizes that it bundled the petitions from the six small refineries before us together with a host of other similar petitions and dispatched them all in a pair of administrative decisions. See Brief for Petitioner 28; 86 F. 4th, at 1129–1130. For another, the agency stresses that, in evaluating each refinery’s petition, it relied on a single interpretation of the statutory phrase “ ‘disproportionate economic hardship’ ” and a single economic model (the agency’s “RIN passthrough theory”). Ante , at 5.¶

The Court correctly holds that none of this transforms EPA’s challenged actions into “nationally applicable” actions. Ante , at 10. Yes, the agency may choose to bundle petitions together for administrative convenience. And, yes, the agency may apply similar reasoning when faced with similar petitions. But, as the Court recognizes, the only “action” the Act’s substantive provisions call on EPA to take is to grant or deny an individual hardship petitionand that is a locally applicable action, not a national one. Ibid .¶

As I see it, this same insight defeats EPA’s suggestion that its actions were “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” §7607(b)(1). As a matter of administrative convenience, the agency may choose to address a number of petitions collectively rather than separately. And the agency of course may (and, to avoid acting arbitrarily and capriciously, generally must) apply consistent reasoning to like petitions. But the Act’s venue provision does not route cases to one circuit or another based on how EPA packages them or the quality or nature of its reasoning. Instead, the Act’s venue provision asks whether the agency based its action on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. And, as the Act’s substantive provisions make clear, EPA does no such thing when it passes on an individual small refinery’s hardship petition.¶

II¶

Turn now to how the Court resolves this case. As we have seen, the Court first holds that EPA’s decision whether to grant or deny an individual small refinery’s hardship petition is a locally or regionally applicable “action.” See Part II, ante . Accordingly, the Court starts with the (correct) presumption that the suit before us belongs in a regional circuit. Ibid . But then, the Court reverses course. While EPA’s challenged actions are local or regional ones, the¶

Court concludes, this case belongs in the D. C. Circuit because the agency’s actions were “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” See Part III, ante . That portion of the Court’s opinion strikes me as both mistaken and likely to cause confusion about where Clean Air Act disputes should be heard.¶

To understand why, consider how the Court proceeds. Pursuing what it calls an “ordinary-meaning” approach, the Court observes that the word “determination” often refers to the ''settling and ending of a controversy.'' Ante , at 14 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 616 (1976)). Extrapolating from that dictionary definition, the Court reasons that “ any EPA conclusion within the four corners of an action” qualifies as a “determination.” Ante , at 18 (emphasis added).¶

But, the Court continues, whether an action is ''based on'' a conclusion of nationwide scope or effect depends on a “degree of causality.” Ante , at 14. Nor will just any degree of causality do. Proving that some nationwide conclusion (or now, the Court adds, “justification” or “reasoning”) is the “but-for” cause of the agency’s action will not suffice. Ante , at 14–15. Instead, EPA must establish that some nationwide conclusion (or justification or reasoning) qualifies as the “gravamen” or “core” or “driver” of its action. Ante , at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). And when EPA’s actions rely “in significant part on . . . ‘intensely factual’ considerations” or when “the key driver of EPA’s action is otherwise debatable,” that standard will not be satisfied. Ibid .¶

Applying all those ideas to this case, the Court holds that all of EPA’s challenged actions were based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. That is so, the Court says, because EPA’s actions (its decisions to deny the small refineries’ petitions) rested at their “core” on a common (or “nationwide”) understanding of the statutory phrase ''disproportionate economic hardship'' and a common (or¶

“nationwide”) economic model. Ante , at 17 (quoting §7545( o )(9)(B)(i)). To be sure, the Court acknowledges, the agency also undertook a “review of refinery-specific facts.” Ante , at 18. But on the Court’s account, those “refineryspecific facts” mattered less to the outcomes here than EPA’s statutory interpretation and its economic model. Ibid .¶

I find that chain of reasoning unpersuasive for a few reasons. For one thing, it seems to me pretty far afield from the statutory text. As we have seen, the Clean Air Act’s venue provision speaks of actions and determinations, and the Act’s substantive provisions do too. And when a substantive provision calls for either a nationally applicable “action” or a “determination” of nationwide scope or effect, it says so. To decide where a case belongs, then, no special judicially devised test is required. Instead, lawyers and judges need only open the statute books, find the relevant substantive provision, and follow its lead. As we have seen, the Court takes just this approach when addressing the meaning of the term “action” in the Act’s venue provision. There, it concludes EPA took no nationally applicable “action” because the Act’s substantive provisions “pe[g]” an action to a decision to grant or deny an individual hardship petition. Ante , at 10; see Part I–B, supra . On my view, we should employ that same statute-driven approach to the meaning of “a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”¶

For another thing, the Court’s test conflates a determination with the reasons that inform it. Statutes often “distinguis[h] between ‘considerations’ that inform [a] ‘determination,’ and the ‘determination’ itself.” Commissioner v. Zuch , 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 6) (alteration omitted). The Clean Air Act is no different. It authorizes EPA to take certain actions (like waiving renewable fuel mandates or disapproving a single Governor’s suspension of a SIP component). The Act authorizes those actions if certain determinations are made (like a determination that enforcing the renewable fuel mandates would severely harm the national economy or a determination that a Governor’s partial SIP suspension doesn’t satisfy certain criteria). And to support its determinations, the agency may offer any number of reasons. To avoid accusations of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking, too, the agency will usually employ consistent reasoning in like cases. See, e.g. , Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro , 579 U. S. 211, 222 (2016). But none of that means we should conflate the determinations EPA must make under the Act with the reasons the agency offers to support them.¶

For another thing still, I worry that the Court’s test will prove tough for lower courts and lawyers to apply in practice. Having conflated a “determination” with the agency’s underlying reasoning, the Court must find some way to go about sorting and weighing all the reasons EPA may advance. But just consider what its approach entails. First, lawyers and judges must consult the full scope of the agency’s reasoning (in this case, reasoning that runs over 280 pages). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a–330a. Next, lawyers and judges must “parse” out which aspects of that reasoning are particular to a locality or region and which are national in scope or effect. Ante , at 16. Finally, lawyers and judges must weigh those two sets of reasons against each other and decide which set was the true “driver” of the agency’s decision and which was more “peripheral” to it. Ante , at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).¶

''[L]itigation over whether the case is in the right court is essentially a waste of time and resources.'' Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee , 446 U. S. 458, 464, n. 13 (1980). When it comes to the simple preliminary question where a case should be filed, the rules of the road should be “clear and easy to apply.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago , 583 U. S. 17, 25 (2017); see Hertz Corp. v. Friend , 559 U. S. 77, 94–95 (2010). The test the Court announces today can claim neither of those virtues. For the lawyers and judges tasked with applying it, I can only wish them luck.¶

III¶

To get a sense of the challenges the Court’s test poses for future litigants and lower courts, compare this case to its companion. See Oklahoma v. EPA , 605 U. S. ___ (2025).¶

As we have seen, that dispute involves SIPs, plans States must submit to EPA outlining how they intend to comply with national air quality standards. See Part I–A, supra ; §7410. Among other things, a State’s SIP must address the Act’s “Good Neighbor Provision.” Ohio v. EPA , 603 U. S. 279, 283–284 (2024). Because “air currents can carry pollution across state borders,” id. , at 283, that provision requires each SIP to contain “adequate” measures to prevent in-state “emissions activity” from interfering with other States’ ability to satisfy federal air quality standards, §7410(a)(2)(D). In a single rule, EPA rejected 21 SIPs—including Utah’s and Oklahoma’s—because, in the agency’s view, none satisfied the Act’s Good Neighbor provision. Oklahoma , 605 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4) (citing 88 Fed. Reg. 9336 (2023)). Now, Oklahoma, Utah, and certain industry groups seek to challenge EPA’s actions in court, and they argue that their litigation belongs in a regional circuit. Oklahoma , 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).¶

EPA responds that the SIPs case is, in every way that matters, like the small refineries’ case and thus belongs in the D. C. Circuit too. After all, the agency points out, it employed a common statutory interpretation and a common methodology to assess each State’s proposed SIP—just as it did when considering the small refineries’ petitions. If the one case belongs in the D. C. Circuit, EPA argues, so must the other. See Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 231067 etc., pp. 30, 34–36; Tr. of Oral Arg. in Oklahoma v. EPA , O. T. 2024, No. 23–1067 etc., pp. 39, 47.¶

Along those lines, EPA observes that, in assessing each¶

SIP, it asked whether the state plan before it would contribute more than “1% of the permissible ozone level to a downwind State.” Oklahoma , 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12); Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 9, 35. In practice, EPA argues, that 1% threshold proved critical. SIPs that “fell under the 1 percent de minimis threshold” were “approved on [that] ground.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 23–1067 etc., at 38–39. Meanwhile, all (or nearly all) the SIPs that exceeded the 1% threshold—including Oklahoma’s and Utah’s—were rejected. See Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 7; Brief for State of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 23–1067 etc., pp. 24–25, n. 20. Accordingly, the agency argues, even if it took a local or regional “action” with respect to each SIP, nationwide determinations proved “essential to EPA’s reasoning in disapproving the state plans.” Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 37.¶

The Court disagrees. As it must under the test it announces, the Court begins by consulting all the various reasons EPA offered (some 60-plus pages of them appear in the Federal Register). Oklahoma , 605 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 10–13). 2 In doing so, the Court acknowledges that EPA used a common (or nationwide) statutory interpretation and a common (or nationwide) methodology when assessing all of the SIPs. See id ., at ___ (slip op., at 9). The Court recognizes, too, that the 1% threshold played a significant role in separating the SIPs EPA approved from those it rejected. See id ., at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–13). Still, when it comes to weighing the role that EPA’s common (or nationwide) justifications played, the Court concludes, they were not the “primary drivers” of the agency’s challenged actions. Id ., at ___ (slip op., at 12). Instead,¶

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2 See 88 Fed. Reg. 9336 (omnibus rule); 87 Fed. Reg. 31470 (2022) (Air Plan Disapproval; Utah); id ., at 9798 (Air Plan Disapproval; Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas).¶

“factual determinations particular to the State at issue” predominated. Id ., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on that assessment, the Court holds that Oklahoma’s and Utah’s lawsuit challenging EPA’s rejection of their SIPs belongs in a regional circuit. Id ., at ___ (slip op., at 13).¶

Maybe that’s right. But I can certainly imagine arriving at the opposite outcome under the Court’s test. After all, EPA used a common statutory interpretation and a common methodology when assessing all of the SIPs, proceeding much as it did when evaluating the small refineries’ hardship petitions. In both cases, too, the agency factored in certain local considerations, like individual “Stat[e] circumstances” in the SIPs case, id ., at ___ (slip op., at 10), and individualized “data and information” in the small refineries’ case, App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a–95a. Of course, the Court thinks EPA leaned more heavily on individualized reasons in the SIPs case, and more heavily on common ones in the small refineries’ case. Oklahoma , 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11). But without any objective standard for weighing which predominates, there seems to me ample room for good-faith disagreement between litigants and among lower courts. And it is just that kind of ambiguity that promises protracted and expensive venue litigation going forward.¶

To avoid that problem, I would resolve the SIPs case the same way I would resolve the small refineries’ case: by looking to the Act itself. Section 7410(k)(3) requires EPA to approve or disapprove SIPs and, in passing on them, to assess whether each individual State has or has not complied with its obligations under federal law. See id. , at ___ (slip op., at 3). Nowhere does that substantive provision call for a nationally applicable action or task EPA with making a determination of nationwide scope or effect. And no more is needed to know that, under the Act’s venue provision, the SIPs dispute before us belongs in a regional circuit. Id ., at¶

___ (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1).¶

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At the end of the day, venue rules are like traffic laws. They simply tell litigants where to go, and they should be easy to follow. As I read it, the Clean Air Act provides a clear rule for cases like this one. Applying that rule here, I would direct the parties to the appropriate regional circuit. The Court doing otherwise, I respectfully dissent.¶