Stanley v. City of Sanford

Justice Gorsuch announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join.¶

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act bars employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . compensation” and other matters. 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a). The statute defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” § 12111(8). The question before us concerns whether a retired employee who does not hold or seek a job is a “qualified individual.”¶

I¶

Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we take as true the well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff 's complaint, National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo , 602 U. S. 175, 181 (2024), and do not consider evidence beyond that pleading, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(d); Carter v. Stanton , 405 U. S. 669, 671 (1972) ( per curiam ). With those constraints in mind, we begin by setting out the facts as the plaintiff, Karyn Stanley, has alleged them.¶

Ms. Stanley started working as a frefghter for the city of Sanford, Florida (City), in 1999. At first, she planned to serve for 25 years. Complaint in No. 6:20–cv–00629 (MD Fla.), ECF Doc. 1, ¶¶ 13, 16 (Complaint). Part of the reason for that had to do with health insurance. At the time the City hired her, it offered health insurance until age 65 for two categories of retirees: those who retired with 25 years of service, and those who retired earlier because of a disability. Id ., ¶ 19. In 2003, though, the City changed its policy. Going forward, it said, it would continue to pay for health insurance up to age 65 for retirees with 25 years of service. Id ., ¶¶ 20–21. But for those who retired earlier due to disability, the City announced, it would now provide health insurance for just 24 months, unless the retiree started receiving Medicare benefits sooner. Id ., ¶ 20. At some point after the City revised its policy, Ms. Stanley's complaint does not say when, she began to suffer from an unspecified disability. Id ., ¶ 16. And, in 2018, that “disability forced her to retire” earlier than she had planned. Ibid . Under the City's revised policy, that meant she was entitled to at most 24 months of health insurance.¶

Based on these facts, Ms. Stanley brought suit claiming that the City had violated the ADA and a number of other state and federal laws. Providing different healthinsurance benefits to those who retire with 25 years of service and those who retire earlier due to disability, she contended, amounted to impermissible discrimination based on disability. The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss Ms. Stanley's complaint for failure to state a claim.¶

The district court denied that motion in part, allowing some of Ms. Stanley's claims to proceed. But with respect to her ADA claim, the district court saw things differently. Ms. Stanley's complaint, the court observed, alleged that the City had treated her worse than other similarly situated individuals because of her disability, App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a22a, what is known as a disparate-treatment claim, see Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez , 540 U. S. 44, 53 (2003). To state such a claim under the ADA, the court continued, § 12112(a) required her to allege, among other things, facts sufficient to show that she was a “qualified individual” at the time of the City's alleged discrimination. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. But in this case, the court reasoned, the discrimination Ms. Stanley alleged—reduced healthcare benefits—did not take place until after she retired. And by that point, she was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA because she was not someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” § 12111(8); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a. As a result, the court held, it had no choice but to grant the City's motion to dismiss her ADA claim. Id ., at 26a.¶

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It, too, concluded that § 12112(a) does not reach allegations of discrimination against a retiree “who does not hold or desire to hold an employment position” that she is capable of performing with reasonable accommodation. 83 F. 4th 1333, 1337 (2023). But, the court acknowledged, not every court of appeals would agree. Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have said that Title I's antidiscrimination provision “does not protect people who neither held nor desired a job with the defendant at the time of discrimination.” Id ., at 1341. But the Second and Third Circuits take a different view. As those courts see it, the ADA's definition of “qualified individual” is “ambiguous,” and they have resolved that ambiguity “in favor of” extending the statute to reach retirees like Ms. Stanley. Ibid .¶

We granted certiorari to resolve the circuits' disagreement over whether § 12112(a) reaches discrimination against retirees who neither hold nor desire a job whose essential tasks they can perform with reasonable accommodation. 602 U. S. 1038 (2024).¶

II¶

A¶

The ADA contains five titles separately addressing employment, public entities, public accommodations, telecommunications, and miscellaneous matters. 104 Stat. 327–328. Ms. Stanley brought her suit under Title I, which speaks to employment. Section 12112(a) provides Title I's general liability rule for disability discrimination. It makes it unlawful for a covered employer to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . compensation,” among other things.¶

The parties disagree about the meaning of this language, but their dispute is a narrow one. They take as given that retirement benefits, like those at issue here, qualify as “compensation.” See Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U. S. 69, 77 (1984); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC , 462 U. S. 669, 682 (1983). For purposes of our review, we may also assume that the City's revision to its retirement-benefits plan constituted “discrimina[tion] . . . on the basis of disability.” The only question that separates the parties is whether § 12112(a) addresses discrimination against retirees like Ms. Stanley. She (and two circuits) think the answer is yes; the City (and several other circuits) believe otherwise.¶

To resolve that disagreement, we turn, as we must, to the statutory terms Congress has given us. Section 12112(a) tells us that Title I prohibits discrimination against “qualified individual[s].” And a qualified individual, Title I continues, is someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that [she] holds or desires.” § 12111(8). From these directions, one clue emerges immediately. “[T]o ascertain a statute's temporal reach,” this Court has “frequently looked to Congress' choice of verb tense.” Carr v. United States , 560 U. S. 438, 448 (2010). And here, Congress has made it unlawful to “ discriminate against” someone who “ can perform the essential functions of” the job she “ holds or desires. ” Those present-tense verbs signal that § 12112(a) protects individuals who, with or without reasonable accommodation, are able to do the job they hold or seek at the time they suffer discrimination. Conversely, those verbs tend to suggest that the statute does not reach retirees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an alleged act of discrimination.¶

Reinforcing this assessment is the statute's definition of “reasonable accommodation.” Title I, recall, prohibits discrimination against an individual who can perform essential job functions “with or without reasonable accommodation.” § 12111(8); see § 12112(a). And a “reasonable accommodation,” the ADA provides, refers to things like “job restructuring,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,” and altering “training materials or policies.” §12111(9). Those kinds of accommodations make perfect sense when it comes to current employees or applicants. But it is hard to see how they might apply to retirees who do not hold or seek a job.¶

Section 12112(b) conveys a similar message. That provision offers examples of what constitutes “ `discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.' ” So, for instance, subsection (b)(6) defines discrimination to include using certain “qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria” unless they are “job-related for the position in question.” Plainly, that mandate aims to protect jobseekers. But it makes no sense in the context of retirees who do not seek employment. The same goes for subsection (b)(7), which requires that “tests concerning employment . . . accurately reflect the skills” and “aptitude” of an “employee or applicant.” It would be strange for employers to test the job skills of former employees who do not plan to return to work. This pattern repeats itself throughout § 12112(b), underscoring § 12112(a)'s focus on current and prospective employees—not retirees.¶

Instructive, too, is the fact that another part of the statute speaks differently. Where § 12112(a) prohibits certain acts of employment discrimination against “a qualified individual,” § 12203(a) prohibits retaliation against “any individual” who opposes a discriminatory act. That Congress used different language in these two provisions strongly suggests that it meant for them to work differently. After all, when a document uses a term in one place and a materially different term in another, “ `the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea.' ” Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon , 596 U. S. 450, 458 (2022) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012)).¶

Further evidence still comes from examining Title I of the ADA in light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78¶

Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq . The two statutes share much in common, not least the fact that they both address employment discrimination. See Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido , 586 U. S. 1, 4, n. 1 (2018). But the statutes also bear differences we have found illuminating in the past. See, e . g ., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. , 575 U. S. 768, 773 (2015) . And one difference concerns the class of people the statutes protect. Title VII protects “employees,” § 2000e–3(a), a term that law defines without “any temporal qualifier,” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U. S. 337, 342 (1997). In keeping with that unqualified term, Title VII sometimes bars discrimination against former employees as well as current ones. Id ., at 341. But elsewhere in Title VII, context clarifies that “the term `employee' refers unambiguously to a current employee.” Id. , at 343. That is true, for instance, where the statute links the term “employee” to present-tense verbs like work and has . Id ., at 341, n. 2, 343. The upshot? Even if the ADA's reference to a “qualified individual,” like Title VII's reference to an “employee,” might be read in isolation to encompass retirees, once Congress yokes those kinds of terms to present-tense verbs—such “holds,” “desires,” and “can perform”—that assumption becomes considerably less plausible.¶

Beyond all this textual evidence lies our precedent. Construing an earlier version of Title I in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. , this Court explained that “[a]n ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a `qualified individual with a disability'—that is, a person `who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions' of her job.” 526 U. S. 795, 806 (1999) (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 12111(8)). Accordingly, the Court concluded, “a plaintiff's sworn assertion” that she is “ `unable to work' will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case.” 526 U. S., at 806. In saying as much, the Court anticipated the possibility that someone may fall outside the protections of § 12112(a) if she can “ `no longer do the job.' ”¶

Id ., at 799; accord, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg , 527 U. S. 555, 567 (1999). 1¶

B¶

Against this evidence of statutory meaning, Ms. Stanley and the dissent offer several replies. They begin by suggesting that we should interpret § 12112(a)'s “qualified individual” requirement as imposing only a “conditional mandate.” Brief for Petitioner 28; post , at 87–88 (opinion of Jackson, J. ). As Ms. Stanley and the dissent see it, if a plaintiff claims discrimination with respect to a job she seeks or holds, then she must show that she is able to perform that job's essential functions. Brief for Petitioner 28. But if the plaintiff neither holds nor desires a job, the argument goes, then she must make no such showing. In that case, the plaintiff is necessarily a “qualified individual,” because it is impossible for someone to be unqualified for a nonexistent position. Id ., at 40. Through this series of steps, we are asked to conclude, every retiree is a “qualified individual.”¶

As easy as it may be to imagine a statute like the one Ms. Stanley and the dissent outline, it bears scant resemblance to the one Congress enacted. Title I might have said, for example, that a qualified individual is one who “can perform the essential functions of the employment position, if any , that such individual holds or desires.” See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 9. But nothing like that italicized language appears in § 12112(a). And even supposing Ms. Stanley's conditionalmandate theory were a textually permissible way to understand the statute, we do not usually pick a conceivable-but-¶

1 After Cleveland , Congress amended the ADA so that it no longer requires a plaintiff to show that she was a qualified individual “ ` with a disability ' ” at the time of the defendant's discrimination. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 3557 (emphasis added). But this change in statutory directions does nothing to call into question Cleveland 's insight that a plaintiff must plead and prove that she was a “qualified individual” when the defendant's discrimination took place.¶

convoluted interpretation over the ordinary one. Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States , 585 U. S. 274, 277 (2018); cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15 (Ms. Stanley acknowledging that her reading may “not [be] the most intuitive” one).¶

Separately, Ms. Stanley attempts a surplusage argument. Brief for Petitioner 32–33, 46. She contends that our interpretation of “qualified individual” would render meaningless part of § 12112(b)(5)(A), which defines discrimination to include the failure to reasonably accommodate “an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee .” (Emphasis added.) After all, Ms. Stanley suggests, if every “qualified individual” holds or desires a job, then § 12112(b)(5)(A)'s reference to “applicant or employee” performs no real work. To avoid that outcome, she submits, the class of qualified individuals must include retirees.¶

Difficulties attend this argument as well. To start, our reading of “qualified individual” may still leave work for “applicant or employee” to perform in § 12112(b)(5)(A). It might be, for example, that the phrase “applicant or employee” narrows the provision, so that it does not refer to a “nonapplicant” who desires but does not apply for a job. Cf. Davoll v. Webb , 194 F. 3d 1116, 1132 (CA10 1999); Daugherty v. El Paso , 56 F. 3d 695, 699 (CA5 1995). But even if the phrase “applicant or employee” is redundant, serving only to underscore that § 12112(b)(5)(A) extends beyond existing employees to those seeking work, “[t]he canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.” Marx v. General Revenue Corp. , 568 U. S. 371, 385 (2013). And it certainly does not require us to favor “an unusual meaning that will avoid surplusage” over a more natural one. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 176.¶

Perhaps sensing that Title I's definition of “qualified individual” goes against them, Ms. Stanley and the dissent next effectively ask us to strike it from the statute. As they point out, Title I allows “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability” to sue. § 12117(a). And a plaintiff may file that suit whenever she “is affected by” discrimination. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Finally, such suits can challenge discriminatory “compensation.” § 12112(a); see Brief for Petitioner 21. Putting this all together, Ms. Stanley and the dissent reason, this case checks all the boxes: Ms. Stanley is a “person” suing about discriminatory “compensation” that “affected” her during retirement. And that is all Title I requires—making “the `qualified individual' language . . . largely beside the point.” Id ., at 21; see post , at 95–96 (opinion of Jackson , J .).¶

This argument misapprehends the nature of Title I's protections. It may be that “retirement benefits are `compensation' protected by the Act.” Brief for Petitioner 21. No one before us disputes that point. But § 12112(a) does not protect “compensation” as such. Instead, it bars employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . compensation.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, the statute protects people, not benefits, from discrimination. And the statute also tells us who those people are: qualified individuals, those who hold or seek a job at the time of the defendant's alleged discrimination. § 12111(8). So rather than resolve anything, this argument takes us right back to where we started. 2¶

Failing all else, Ms. Stanley and the dissent ask us to look beyond text and precedent. Brief for Petitioner 29, 47; post , at 92–93 (opinion of Jackson, J. ). Finding “pure textualism” insufficiently pliable to secure the result they seek, they invoke the statute's “primary purpose” and “legislative his-¶

2 Seeking to downplay § 12111(8)'s definition of “qualified individual” in yet another way, the dissent suggests it does not “make any sense ” to think Congress used that “provision to moonlight as . . . a temporal restriction” on antidiscrimination protections. Post , at 90–91 (opinion of Jackson , J .). But § 12111(8)'s express terms can hardly be so casually dismissed. Their day job is to work together with § 12112(a) to define the reach of Title I's protections.¶

tory.” Post , at 75, 89–90, 96. As they see it, the ADA's goal of eradicating disability-based discrimination would be best served by a decision extending Title I's protections beyond those who hold or seek a job to retirees.¶

But this submission falters, too. For one thing, and as this Court has “emphasized many times,” what Congress (possibly) expected matters much less than what it (certainly) enacted. Patel v. Garland , 596 U. S. 328, 346 (2022). Nobody disputes the ADA's stated ambition to root out “discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” § 12101(b)(1). But it is “quite mistaken to assume . . . that any interpretation of a law that does more to advance a statute's putative goal must be the law.” Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools , 598 U. S. 142, 150 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Legislation is, after all, the art of compromise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms often the price of passage, and no statute yet known pursues its stated purpose at all costs.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. , 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Accordingly, this Court has long recognized that the “textual limitations upon a law's scope” must be understood as “no less a part of its purpose than its substantive authorizations.” Kucana v. Holder , 558 U. S. 233, 252 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).¶

For another, we cannot say Title I's textual limitations necessarily clash with the ADA's broader purposes. One court of appeals, for example, has predicted that judicial innovations extending § 12112(a)'s protections to retirees might “create perverse incentives” by encouraging employers to reduce retirement healthcare benefits for people with disabilities. Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co . and AFL -CIO -CLC , 268 F. 3d 456, 458 (CA7 2001). See how that dynamic might play out in this case. The 24-month health-insurance benefit at issue here bridges the typical gap between disability retirement and the start of Medicare eligibility. Brief for Respondent 7 (citing 42 U. S. C. § 426(b)(2)(A)); see Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center , 597 U. S. 424, 428 (2022). Responding to a decision holding that § 12112(a) addresses discrimination against retirees, the City might simply delete any reference to disability from its retirement policy to ensure that it contains no “disability-based distinction.” Complaint ¶30. The result? Anyone who served 25 years would get subsidized health insurance. Everyone else, regardless of disability, would get nothing. Cf. App. 42–44.¶

Whether adopting Ms. Stanley's and the dissent's view of the statute would encourage outcomes like that is anyone's guess. But the possibility underscores why Congress's decision to limit the scope of Title I's antidiscrimination provision is not necessarily at war with the ADA's broader aims. Nor, of course, do the law's present limitations preclude future legislation from going further. If Congress wishes to extend Title I to reach retirees like Ms. Stanley, it can. But the decision whether to do so lies with that body, not this one. See, e. g. , National Pork Producers Council v. Ross , 598 U. S. 356, 382 (2023) (opinion of Gorsuch , J .).¶

For another thing yet, other avenues may exist for retirees like Ms. Stanley to seek relief. As her own complaint suggests (but the dissent neglects), a variety of other laws besides Title I of the ADA may protect retirees from discrimination with respect to postemployment benefits. Complaint ¶1 (alleging claims under state law and the Rehabilitation Act, and an equal protection claim under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983); see also Brief for Local Government Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 13–14 (discussing state-law remedies); Weyer v . Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. , 198 F. 3d 1104, 1112 (CA9 2000) (discussing other potential remedies). As we discuss below, too, even Title I, with its “qualified individual” limitation, may reach many claims involving discrimination with respect to retirement benefits. 3¶

3 In a final line of attack, the dissent criticizes us for “reach[ing] out” to decide whether the ADA addresses discrimination against retirees who neither hold nor desire a job. Post , at 98–99 (opinion of Jackson, J.) . But¶

III¶

We took this case to resolve a circuit split over whether a retired employee who does not hold or seek a job is a “qualified individual” under Title I. In her merits briefing, Ms. Stanley invites us to address not just that question but another one, too. Even if § 12112(a) protects only those who hold or seek a job when a challenged act of discrimination occurs, she says, we should decide whether her complaint satisfies that standard. The government, as amicus , joins in this request. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26–28. Ordinarily, of course, this Court rejects attempts to inject “an entirely new question at the merits stage.” Post , at 71 ( Thomas , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But we find it profitable to make an exception in this case, for while taking up Ms. Stanley's additional question reveals some problems with her pleading, it also highlights how Title I might provide relief for retirees like her.¶

In addressing this additional question, we take as given the Court's holding above that a plaintiff pursuing a claim under § 12112(a) must plead and prove that she held or¶

here is the truth of it. Ms. Stanley petitioned this Court for certiorari, asking us to resolve a “long-running” circuit split concerning whether an individual who “no longer holds or seeks to hold” a job may sue under the Title I “for discrimination that harms her post-employment.” Pet. for Cert. 15. After we granted her petition, Ms. Stanley renewed her argument that she had suffered actionable postemployment discrimination. Brief for Petitioner 24, 47. The City disagreed. Brief for Respondent 27–36. There is nothing remarkable about this Court resolving that dispute and the question presented. To be sure, after we granted review, Ms. Stanley's merits briefs sought to inject an additional issue into the case, now arguing that she also suffered discrimination “while she was still employed.” Post , at 66 ( Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment ). But to suggest that the case before us does not involve a postemployment discrimination, and that the Court “reaches out” to issue an “ `advisory opinio[n]' ” on the subject, ignores both why we took this case and the arguments of the parties before us. Post , at 76, 84, 9899 (opinion of Jackson, J.).¶

sought a job when the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of disability. We take as given, too, that unlawful discrimination can take place at any one of three points in time: When a defendant “adopt[s]” a “discriminatory . . . practice,” when an individual “is affected by application of a discriminatory . . . practice,” or when she “becomes subject to” such a practice. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). With all that in mind, we turn to consider whether Ms. Stanley's pleading states a claim.¶

Start with the first option. Unlawful discrimination occurs “when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted.” § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Here, Ms. Stanley alleges that happened in 2003, when the City revised its health-insurance policy for employees who retire because of disability. Complaint ¶¶ 20–21. At that point, her allegations show, she was a “qualified individual,” working as a frefghter and able to perform the job's essential functions. See id ., ¶¶ 13–15.¶

The trouble for Ms. Stanley is that § 12112(a) does not prohibit disability-based discrimination in the abstract. Instead, it bars an employer from “ discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” (Emphasis added.) “ `Discriminate against' means treat worse,” Muldrow v. St. Louis , 601 U. S. 346, 355 (2024), and “refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals,” Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White , 548 U. S. 53, 59 (2006). And Ms. Stanley's complaint provides no basis for inferring that the City's policy injured her in 2003. To the contrary, her complaint suggests that, when the City first issued its policy, she was not disabled and still expected to complete 25 years of service. See Complaint ¶ 15; see also Brief for Appellant in No. 22–10002 (CA11), p. 22, n. 5 (Ms. Stanley representing that she was “unaffected by” the City's actions as of 2003). So the first option is off the table for Ms. Stanley. Even so, it may be available to others who happen to be retired at the time they sue, if they can plead and prove they were both disabled and “qualified” when their employer adopted a discriminatory retirement-benefits policy. 4¶

Turn next to the second option. Unlawful discrimination also occurs “when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.” § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Ms. Stanley alleges that happened to her in 2020, when her subsidized health insurance ran out. Complaint ¶ 26; see also Brief for Petitioner 24 (Ms. Stanley was “ `affected by application of' the policy” in “2020 when . . . she was denied the health care subsidy”); 83 F. 4th, at 1343. By then, however, she had been retired for two years, could not satisfy the “requirements of” her job, and was not seeking employment. Complaint ¶ 16. So this option, too, cannot help Ms. Stanley. But, once more, it might help others who can show that they were affected by a policy change while they were “qualified individuals,” even if they happen to be retired by the time they bring suit.¶

Now turn to the third option. Unlawful discrimination takes place when “an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.” § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). This option might be especially promising for plaintiffs in Ms. Stanley's shoes. But, for reasons that take a little unpacking, it cannot form a basis for reversing the Eleventh Circuit's judgment in this particular case.¶

4 To be clear, not every Title I plaintiff must plead and prove she had a disability when she suffered discrimination. As we have seen, § 12112(a) in its present form prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” (Emphasis added.) That provision does not require a qualified individual to be disabled. So, for instance, Title I defines discrimination “on the basis of disability” to include associational discrimination—that is, discriminating against a qualified individual “because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” § 12112(b)(4). In such cases, it does not matter whether the qualified individual also happened to have a disability. The difficulty for Ms. Stanley, however, is that her complaint does not allege anything along those lines either.¶

Recall that Ms. Stanley's complaint does not allege what her disability is or when it emerged. As it happens, those facts came out later, after the district court dismissed her ADA claim, and after the parties proceeded to discovery and summary judgment on the remaining counts of her complaint. From this later-developed record, it appears that Ms. Stanley was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease in 2016. 83 F. 4th, at 1336.¶

The government argues that these later-developed facts are sufficient to state a claim. After all, during the 2-year period between her diagnosis in 2016 and her retirement in 2018, Ms. Stanley was both “an individual with a disability” and a “qualified individual” who “could still perform the essential functions of her job.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26–27. During that critical window, too, the government submits, Ms. Stanley was “subject to” an “allegedly discriminatory benefits policy” that reduced her future retirement compensation. Id ., at 26; see also Brief for Petitioner 25–26; post , at 79–80 ( Jackson, J., dissenting).¶

As promising as that theory may be, however, a number of case-specific problems prevent it from helping Ms. Stanley here. For starters, because this dispute comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we cannot look beyond the pleadings. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(d). And her complaint says nothing about the timing or nature of her diagnosis, nor does it allege that she worked for any period of time with a disability. To be sure, a court might, with a little more, draw a “plausible inference” that Ms. Stanley suffered discrimination between 2016 and 2018. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U. S. 662, 682 (2009). So, for instance, if she had alleged that she developed Parkinson's disease before 2018, or that she worked for any period with some disability, then her case could likely proceed. But the complaint before us does not contain any of those facts.¶

Even assuming we could overcome that problem, we would only face another. The Eleventh Circuit held that Ms. Stanley had affirmatively disavowed the government's theory. For support, the court pointed to Ms. Stanley's representation in her brief below that she did “not claim she was impacted by the discriminatory” City policy “during her employment.” Brief for Appellant in No. 22–10002, at 22. To be sure, at oral argument Ms. Stanley told the court of appeals otherwise. Recording of Oral Arg. in No. 22–10002 (CA11, Aug. 24, 2023), at 2:45–2:58. And she attempted to adopt an amicus brief the government submitted to the Eleventh Circuit, advancing a theory much like the one it presses here. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 22–10002 (CA11), pp. 11–12. But applying its own rules of argument preservation, the Eleventh Circuit declined to pass on the government's theory because Ms. Stanley had not presented it to the district court and had “specifically disclaimed” it in her “own brief” on appeal. 83 F. 4th, at 1344. 5¶

Complicating matters further yet, Ms. Stanley has not expressly asked us to address the Eleventh Circuit's preservation rules. Nor has she asked us to reconsider our own general practice of allowing the courts of appeals to determine for themselves what arguments they deem properly before them. See, e . g ., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker , 554 U. S. 471, 487 (2008); Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U. S. 106, 121 (1976); cf. Retirement Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander , 589 U. S. 49, 5253 (2020) ( Kagan , J ., concurring) (“[T]he Court of Appeals may of course determine that under its usual rules of waiver or forfeiture, it will not consider those arguments”). So even if Ms. Stanley's complaint contained sufficient facts to¶

5 While Ms. Stanley disclaimed being “impacted” by the City's policy during her employment, Justice Jackson believes that Ms. Stanley somehow still preserved the government's theory that she was “subject to” discrimination before she retired. Post , at 80–81. The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not see it that way. Nor does the dissent explain how, consistent with Article III, an individual can challenge a policy that she is “subject to” but that does not injure (or “impact”) her. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25, n. 5 (acknowledging the injury requirement).¶

sustain the theory the government now advances, and even if she had preserved that theory below, we would still face serious obstacles to reaching it.¶

In saying as much, we stress that nothing we say today prevents future plaintiffs—or perhaps even Ms. Stanley herself in a future proceeding—from pursuing a theory along the lines the government proposes. It is simply that the theory cannot help Ms. Stanley in the present posture of this case. 6¶

*¶

To sum up, we hold that, to prevail under § 12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination. A variety of suits involving retirement benefits might well proceed under that rule. But, given how this particular case comes to us, we cannot say that the court of appeals erred in upholding the dismissal of Ms. Stanley's complaint. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed.¶

It is so ordered.¶

6 One Member of the Court suggests that the government's theory can save Ms. Stanley's complaint because it “supplies the answer” to this case. Post , at 79 ( Jackson, J., dissenting). But to proceed as Justice Jackson suggests, we would have to abandon our precedents generally entrusting questions of issue and argument preservation to the courts of appeals. We would have to overrule the Eleventh Circuit's waiver ruling without an express invitation to do so. See post , at 75 ( Sotomayor , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And we would have to fault the Eleventh Circuit for failing to consider facts outside the pleading before it. All to address a question that no court passed on below and that we did not take this case to resolve. The dissent may be willing to blow past all those complications to reach its chosen destination. But we do not see how we might. Indeed, we have already gone out of our way—too far, some of our colleagues would say, see post , at 71–73 (opinion of Thomas, J. )—to address Ms. Stanley's late-raised argument in order to help future plaintiffs understand how they might avoid her missteps.¶